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Abstract
A resolution based proof system for a Temporal Logic of Possible Belief is presented. This logic
is the combination of the branching-time temporal logic CTL (representing change over time) with
the modal logic KD45 (representing belief ). Such combinations of temporal or dynamic logics and
modal logics are useful for specifying complex properties of multi-agent systems. Proof methods are
important for developing verification techniques for these complex multi-modal logics. Soundness,
completeness and termination of the proof method are shown and simple examples illustrating its use
are given.  2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The use of agents is now seen as an essential tool in representing, understanding and
implementing complex software systems. In particular, the characterisation of complex
components as intelligent or rational agents allows the system designer to analyse
applications at a much higher level of abstraction. In order to reason about such agents,
a number of theories of rational agency have been developed, such as the BDI [42] and
KARO [44] frameworks. These frameworks are usually represented as complex multi-
modal logics. In addition to their use in agent theories, where the basic representation
of agency and rationality is explored, these logics form the basis for agent-based formal
methods [24]. In both these uses, the notion of proof is important. In agent theories, proof
allows us to examine properties of the overall theory and, in some cases, to characterise
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computation within that theory. In agent-based formal methods, proof is clearly important
in developing verification techniques.
The leading agent theories and formal methods in this area all share similar logical
properties. In particular, the logics used have:
• an informational component, such as being able to represent an agent’s beliefs or
knowledge,
• a dynamic component, allowing the representation of dynamic activity, and
• a motivational component, often representing the agent’s desires, intentions or goals.
These aspects are typically represented as follows:
• Information—modal logic of belief (KD45) or knowledge (S5);
• Dynamism—temporal or dynamic logic;
• Motivation—modal logic of intention (KD) or desire (KD).
Thus, the predominant approaches use relevant combinations, e.g.,
• Moore [36] dynamic logic + knowledge (S5);
• BDI [42] branching temporal logic (CTL or CTL) or linear time temporal logic (PTL)
+ belief (KD45) + desire (KD) + intention (KD);
• KARO [44] dynamic logic (PDL) + belief (KD45) (or knowledge (S5)) + wishes
(KD).
Unfortunately, many of these combinations, particularly those using dynamic logic,
become too complex (not only undecidable, but incomplete) to use in practical situations.
Thus, much current research activity is centred around developing simpler combinations
of non-classical logics that can express many of the same properties as the more complex
combinations, yet are simpler to mechanise. For example, some of our work in this area
has involved developing a simpler logical basis for BDI-like agents [22], while others have
developed temporal logics of knowledge [21].
The aim of this paper is to examine proof methods for one particular logic that is being
developed in this way. This is based on the KARO framework [44] but, rather than using a
very complex combination of logics we, in collaboration with the KARO developers, have
identified a simpler logic just combining a branching-time temporal aspect with a modal
information aspect and have shown how this can be used to successfully represent many of
the core elements of KARO [32,33]. This logic is essentially the branching-time temporal
logic, Computational Tree Logic (CTL) combined with the modal logic KD45. CTL was
first described in [11] and can be distinguished from the variety of branching time temporal
logics proposed in the literature, as every temporal operator, for example ‘ ’ (in the next
moment) must be preceded immediately by a path operator, for example A (on all paths).
Thus an example of a CTL formula is A ϕ, meaning ‘in all possible futures, in the next
moment ϕ holds’.
In previous work, we have developed a proof method based upon clausal resolution for
CTL [9]. We here consider the extension of this approach to the combination of CTL with
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the KD45 modal logic. The method involves the translation to a normal form which reduces
the number of operators to a core set and separates temporal and belief components.
Resolution rules are defined for each component and information between components
is passed via propositional formulae. The completeness proof (which differs from that
given in [9]) for the resulting method involves the construction of a graph representing the
normal form formulae. This graph is shown to be empty if and only if the set of normal
form formulae is unsatisfiable. Deletions of parts of the graph are shown to correspond
with resolution rules.
Thus, the contribution of the paper is to provide a resolution based proof method for
the fusion of CTL and KD45 which is proved to be sound, complete and terminating. As
mentioned above this particular combination of logics was chosen to verify properties from
a core of the KARO language [32,33]. This is a first step towards our goal of verification
of a larger subset of the full KARO language and we hope to extend the framework
we have, to deal with, for example, interaction between the combined logics. Finally,
rather than being viewed in isolation, this work is part of a longer term effort concerning
how to combine a range of modal and temporal logics and provide proof methods for
them.
In Section 2 we give details of this Temporal Logic of Possible Belief, BBn, the fusion
of CTL and multi-modal KD45. A normal form for this logic and details of how to translate
BBn formulae into the normal form is given in Sections 3 and 4. The resolution rules, i.e.,
initial, modal, step and temporal resolution rules for the single modal version of this logic,
BB1 are introduced in Section 5. We consider examples in Section 6 and prove soundness,
completeness and termination for the resolution system for BB1 in Section 7. In Section 8
we discuss the extension of the resolution rules to the multi-modal version of this logic and
in Sections 9 and 10 we consider related work and conclusions.
2. A temporal logic of possible belief
In this section, we give the syntax and semantics of a logic BBn, the fusion of CTL
and multi-modal KD45, a branching-time temporal logic of belief. This is the smallest
logic containing both CTL and multi-modal KD45 but allowing no axioms containing
interactions between the two logics.
2.1. Syntax
Formulae are constructed from a set P = {p,q, r, . . .} of primitive propositions. The
language BBn contains the standard propositional connectives¬ (not), ∨ (or), ∧ (and) and
⇒ (implies). For belief we assume a set of agentsAg = {1, . . . , n} and we introduce a set of
unary modal connectives Bi , for i ∈ Ag, where a formula Biφ is read as “agent i believes
φ”. For the temporal dimension we take the path operators A and E in conjunction with the
usual set of future-time connectives (next), ♦ (sometime or eventually), (always),
U (until) and W (unless or weak until). We interpret these connectives over a discrete,
branching model of time with finite past, and infinite future. The formulae of BBn are
constructed using the following connectives and proposition symbols:
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• a set P of proposition symbols;
• the constants false and true;
• the propositional connectives ¬, ∨, ∧, ⇒;
• the future-time temporal connectives, , ♦, , U and W ;
• the path operators, A, E;
• the modal connectives Bi (where i ∈Ag).
The set of well-formed formulae of BBn, WFFB , is defined by the following rules:
• any element of P is in WFFB ;
• false and true are in WFFB ;
• if F and G are in WFFB then so are
¬F F ∨G F ∧G F ⇒G BiF
A♦F A F A(F U G) A(FWG) A F
E♦F E F E(F UG) E(FWG) E F
where i ∈Ag.
We define some particular classes of formulae that will be useful later.
Definition 1. A literal is either p, or ¬p where p is a proposition.
Definition 2. A modal literal is either Bil or ¬Bil where l is a literal and i ∈Ag.
Definition 3. The belief set for agent i for a set of literals or modal literals X is defined
as Bi_set (X) = {l | Bil ∈X}. In the single agent case this is abbreviated to B_set and is
defined as B_set (X)= {l | Bl ∈X}.
2.2. Semantics
We follow closely the presentation of semantics given in [28]. First, we assume that the
world may be in any of a set, S, of states.
Definition 4. A tree is a structure (S, η), where S is the set of states and η ⊆ S × S is a
relation between states such that
• s0 ∈ S is a unique root node (i.e., ¬∃si ∈ S such that (si , s0) ∈ η);
• for each si ∈ S there exists sj ∈ S such that (si , sj ) ∈ η;
• for all si , sj , sk ∈ S if (sj , si ) ∈ η and (sk, si ) ∈ η then sj = sk ;
• for all si ∈ S, (s0, si ) ∈ η∗ where η∗ is the reflexive, transitive, closure of η.
Let T be the set of all trees.
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Definition 5. A timeline, t , is an infinitely long, linear, discrete sequence of states, indexed
by the natural numbers.
Note that timelines correspond to the runs of Halpern and Vardi [28,29]. Given a set of
trees T , the set of timelines can be extracted by taking the union of the infinite branches of
each tree in T . Let TLines be the set of all timelines in T .
Definition 6. A point, p, is a pair p = (t, u), where t ∈ TLines is a timeline and u ∈ N is a
temporal index into t .
Let Points be the set of all points.
Definition 7. Given T , a set of trees, let TLines be the set of timelines constructed from T .
We say that two timelines t and t ′ coincide up to point (t, n) if, and only if, (t, n′)= (t ′, n′)
for all n′  n. A timeline t ′ extends (t, n) if, and only if, t and t ′ coincide up to (t, n).
Definition 8. Given a timeline, t , a finite sub-sequence of points (t, i), (t, i+ 1), . . . , (t, n)
is abbreviated by [(t, i), (t, n)] and an infinite sub-sequence of states from (t, i) onwards
(t, i), (t, i + 1), (t, i + 2), . . . , known as a suffix of (t, i), is abbreviated by [(t, i), . . .].
Definition 9. A set of all timelines, TLines, is limit closed if it satisfies the following
condition. For any timeline t ∈ TLines and any timelines t1, t2, t3, . . . ∈ TLines such that
t and t1 coincide up to a point (t, i), t1 and t2 coincide up to a point (t1, j), t2 and t3
coincide up to a point (t2, k), etc., the following holds: there exists a timeline t ′ as a limit
of the prefixes [(t,0), (t, i)], [(t1, i), (t1, j)], [(t2, j), (t2, k)] . . . .
In the following we assume that the set of all timelines, TLines, is limit closed. It
is easy to see that the set of timelines defined as above also satisfies suffix and fusion
closure properties [18]. Therefore, according to [18], the underlying tree models can
be characterized as Kripke structures. Although capturing the limit closure property
complicates translation into normal form (see Section 3), resulting, in particular, in the
introduction of labels, on the other hand, this property significantly simplifies the resolution
procedure (see Section 5).
Definition 10. A valuation, π , is a function π : Points×P→{T ,F }.
Definition 11. A model, M , for BBn is a structure M = 〈T ,R1, . . . ,Rn,π〉, where:
• T is a set of trees, with a distinguished tree r0;
• Ri , for all i ∈ Ag is the agent accessibility relation over Points, i.e., Ri ⊆ Points ×
Points where each Ri is transitive, serial (∀q ∈ Points,∃q ′ ∈ Points s.t. (q, q ′) ∈ Ri )
and Euclidean (∀q, q ′, q ′′ ∈ Points if (q, q ′) ∈ Ri and (q, q ′′) ∈Ri then (q ′, q ′′) ∈ Ri );
• π is a valuation function, as above.
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〈M,(t, u)〉 |= true
〈M,(t, u)〉 |= p iff π((t, u),p)= T (where p ∈P)
〈M,(t, u)〉 |= ¬F iff 〈M,(t, u)〉 |= F
〈M,(t, u)〉 |= F ∨G iff 〈M,(t, u)〉 |= F or 〈M,(t, u)〉 |=G
〈M,(t, u)〉 |=AF iff 〈M,(t ′, u)〉 |= F for all timelines t ′ extending (t, u)
〈M,(t, u)〉 |= EF iff 〈M,(t ′, u)〉 |= F for some timeline t ′ extending (t, u)
〈M,(t, u)〉 |= F iff 〈M,(t, u+ 1)〉 |= F
〈M,(t, u)〉 |= F iff ∀u′ ∈ N, if (u u′) then 〈M,(t, u′)〉 |= F
〈M,(t, u)〉 |=♦F iff ∃u′ ∈ N, such that (u u′) and 〈M,(t, u′)〉 |= F
〈M,(t, u)〉 |= F UG iff ∃u′ ∈ N such that (u′  u) and 〈M,(t, u′)〉 |=G, and
∀u′′ ∈ N, if (u u′′ < u′) then 〈M,(t, u′′)〉 |= F
〈M,(t, u)〉 |= FWG iff 〈M,(t, u)〉 |= F UG or 〈M,(t, u)〉 |= F
〈M,(t, u)〉 |= BiF iff ∀t ′ ∈ TLines. ∀u′ ∈ N, if ((t, u), (t ′, u′)) ∈ Ri
then 〈M,(t ′, u′)〉 |= F
Fig. 1. Semantics of BBn.
As usual, we define the semantics of the language via the satisfaction relation ‘|=’.
For BBn, this relation holds between pairs of the form 〈M,p〉 (where M is a model and
p ∈ Points), and BBn-formulae. The rules defining the satisfaction relation are given in
Fig. 1. For any formula F , if there is some model M such that 〈M,(t0,0)〉 |= F , for any
timeline t0 extracted from the distinguished tree r0, then F is said to be satisfiable. If
〈M,(t0,0)〉 |= F for all models M , for any timeline t0 extracted from the distinguished
tree r0, then F is said to be valid.
As agent accessibility relations in BBn models are transitive, serial and Euclidean, the
axioms of the normal modal system KD45 are valid in BBn models. They are
K :  Bi(F ⇒G) ⇒ (BiF ⇒ BiG)
D :  BiF ⇒ ¬Bi¬F
4 :  BiF ⇒ BiBiF
5 :  ¬Bi¬F ⇒ Bi¬Bi¬F.
Thus the following are theorems of KD45
 ¬BiBiF ⇔ ¬BiF (1)
¬Bi¬Bi¬F ⇔ Bi¬F. (2)
To prove (1), first to show ⇒ take the contrapositive of 4 to obtain ¬BiBiF ⇒¬BiF .
To show the other direction we have ¬BiF ⇒ Bi¬BiF from 5 and Bi¬BiF ⇒¬BiBiF
from D so ¬BiF ⇒ ¬BiBiF . Similarly to prove (2) take the contrapositive of 5, i.e.,
¬Bi¬Bi¬F ⇒ Bi¬F to show ⇒ for the other direction we have Bi¬F ⇒ BiBi¬F
from 4 and BiBi¬F ⇒¬Bi¬Bi¬F from D so Bi¬F ⇒¬Bi¬Bi¬F . The result follows.
Theorems (1) and (2) are important as they show that any literal prefixed by two or more
Bi operators, for some i ∈Ag, is equivalent to a literal prefixed by at most one Bi operator.
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Thus our normal form described in the subsequent section only requires at most one Bi
operator applied to a literal.
To assist the understanding of the translation to the normal form given in Section 3 we
list some equivalent BBn formulae where P is either A or E (but is the same operator on
both sides of the equivalence).
¬A F ≡ E ¬F
¬E F ≡ A ¬F
¬A F ≡ E♦¬F
¬E F ≡ A♦¬F
¬A♦F ≡ E ¬F
¬E♦F ≡ A ¬F
P F ≡ F ∧ P P F
P♦F ≡ F ∨ P P♦F
P(F UG) ≡ G∨ (F ∧ P P(F UG))
¬A(F UG) ≡ E(¬GW (¬F ∧¬G))
¬E(F UG) ≡ A(¬GW (¬F ∧¬G))
P(FWG) ≡ G∨ (F ∧ P P(FWG))
¬A(FWG) ≡ E(¬GU (¬F ∧¬G))
¬E(FWG) ≡ A(¬GU (¬F ∧¬G)).
These are standard, see [18] for example.
In the following, l are literals, m are literals or modal literals and D are disjunctions of
literals or modal literals.
3. A normal form for temporal logic of possible belief
The normal form we use is known as SNFB and is based on SNF (see for example
[25]). For the purposes of the normal form we introduce a symbol start such that
〈M,(t0,0)〉 |= start for any timeline t0 extracted from the distinguished tree r0. Formulae
in SNFB are of the general form
A ∗
∧
i
Li
where each Li is known as a clause and must be one of the following forms and A ∗ is
the universal relation. A ∗ can be defined by using the operators E, informally everyone
believes
Eϕ⇔
∧
i∈Ag
Biϕ
and C, common belief Cϕ ⇔ E(ϕ ∧ Cϕ) as follows A ∗ϕ ⇔ A (ϕ ∧ CA ∗ϕ).
Clauses are of the following form.
start ⇒
r∨
b=1
lb (an initial clause)
g∧
a=1
ka ⇒A 
r∨
b=1
lb (an A step clause)
g∧
a=1
ka ⇒ E 
r∨
b=1
lb〈cj〉 (an E step clause)
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g∧
a=1
ka ⇒A♦l (an A sometime clause)
g∧
a=1
ka ⇒ E♦l〈cj〉 (an E sometime clause)
true⇒
r∨
b=1
m1b (a 1-belief clause)
. . .⇒ . . .
true⇒
r∨
b=1
mnb (an n-belief clause)
true⇒
r∨
b=1
lb (a literal clause).
Here ka , lb , and l are literals, mib are either literals or modal literals involving the Bi
operator and 〈cj〉 is a path label that is present on E step and E sometime clauses. This
label indicates a particular path and arises, for example, from the translation of formulae
such as E(F UG). During the translation to the normal form such formulae are translated
into several E step clauses and an E sometime clause (which ensures that G must actually
hold). To indicate that all these clauses refer to the same path they are annotated with a
label.
The outer ‘A ∗’ operator that surrounds the conjunction of clauses is usually omitted.
Similarly, for convenience the conjunction is dropped and we consider just the set of
clauses Li . Note that literal clauses are just a special case of belief clauses where the
right hand side consists of a disjunction of literals.
3.1. Interpretation of labelled formulae
Once the translation to SNFB has been carried out, all E formulae must be labelled with
some label. Before presenting the semantics of labelled formulae let us recall the following
important property of the underlying CTL tree structures. Without loss of generality we
can assume that the number of successors in the underlying tree structures is bounded and
known in advance (as we know the number of E quantifiers). This enables us to introduce
labels to associate the E formulae at any point in a structure with particular timelines.
Let LAB = {ci, cj, . . .} be the set of labels for a set S of SNFB clauses. Thus, EA〈cj〉
means that A holds along some timeline labelled as 〈cj〉. Dependent on the context of 〈cj〉,
we interpret SNFB clauses as follows.1 A step clause
A ∗(x⇒ E p〈cj〉),
1 Note in [9] two types of labels were used. Here we use the same notation for labels associated with both step
and sometime clauses as their context makes the type clear. That is, labels associated with sometime clauses are
always limit closure type labels and limit closure type labels only appear on sometime clauses.
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where the ‘E’ quantifier is associated with the label 〈cj〉 is understood as follows. For any
timeline t , and any point (t, u), if x is satisfied at a point (t, u) then p must be satisfied at
the point (t ′, u+ 1), along some timeline, t ′, such that t and t ′ coincide up to a point (t, u)
and the suffix, [(t ′, u), . . .], of t ′ is associated with 〈cj〉.
A sometime clause
A ∗(x⇒ E♦p〈cj〉)
is interpreted as follows. For any timeline, t , and any point (t, u), if x is satisfied at a point
(t, u) then p must be satisfied at the point, say, (t ′, v) (u  v), along some timeline, t ′,
such that t and t ′ coincide up to point (t, u) and the suffix, [(t ′, u), . . .], of t ′ is associated
with the limit closure of 〈cj〉.
Note the principal difference between two types of labels mentioned above. Given
A ∗(x ⇒ E p〈cj〉), we reason about E p only ‘one step ahead’, ignoring the future
after p has been satisfied. On the contrary, given A ∗(x ⇒ E♦p〈cj〉), we must reason
about E♦p in the context of a longer period of time (until p is satisfied along some
timeline t ′). Now, taking into account that E♦p = p ∨ E E♦p and associating the
E with 〈cj〉 (as in the previous above case), assume that x is satisfied at a point (t, u)
along some timeline t . If the point (t, u) does not satisfy p then it must satisfy E E♦p.
This means that there must be a point, say (t1, u+ 1), such that it is a successor of (t, u)
along some timeline associated with 〈cj〉 and it satisfies E♦p, etc. Thus, due to the limit
closure property, there is a timeline t ′ which satisfies the requirements of Definition 9.
The construction of the timeline t ′ is represented by labelling E♦p with 〈cj〉 and from its
context, i.e., appearing with the E♦ operators, we conclude it is a “limit closure” timeline.
More details can be found in [6].
3.2. Merged-SNFB
To apply the temporal resolution rule (see Section 5.5), one or more step or literals
clauses may need to be combined. Consequently, a variant on SNFB called merged-SNFB ,
is also required. Given a set of SNFB clauses, any A or E step SNFB clause is also a
merged-SNFB clause. Any literal clause of the form true ⇒ F is written into a merged-
SNFB clause as true ⇒ A F . Any two merged-SNFB clauses may be combined to
produce a merged-SNFB clause as follows.
P ⇒ A F
Q ⇒ A G
(P ∧Q) ⇒ A (F ∧G)
P ⇒ A F
Q ⇒ E G〈cj〉
(P ∧Q) ⇒ E (F ∧G)〈cj〉
P ⇒ E F〈cj〉
Q ⇒ E G〈cj〉
(P ∧Q) ⇒ E (F ∧G)〈cj〉
Thus, as long as labels match, any possible conjunctive combination of SNFB step
clauses or literal clauses rewritten as step clauses can be represented in merged-SNFB .
4. Translation to normal form
In this section, we review the translation of an arbitrary BBn formula into the normal
form.
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Take any formula F of BBn and translate into SNFB by applying the τ0 and τ1
transformations described below (where f is a new proposition).
τ0[F ] −→ A ∗(start ⇒ f )∧ τ1
[
A ∗(f ⇒ F)].
Next, we give the τ1 transformation where x is a proposition. If the main operator on the
right of the implication is a classical operator remove it as follows.
τ1
[
A ∗
(
x⇒ (F ∧G))]−→ τ1[A ∗(x⇒ F)]∧ τ1[A ∗(x⇒G)]
τ1
[
A ∗
(
x⇒ (F ⇒G))]−→ τ1[A ∗(x⇒ (¬F ∨G))]
τ1
[
A ∗
(
x⇒¬(F ∧G))]−→ τ1[A ∗(x⇒ (¬F ∨¬G))]
τ1
[
A ∗
(
x⇒¬(F ⇒G))]−→ τ1[A ∗(x⇒ F)]∧ τ1[A ∗(x⇒¬G)]
τ1
[
A ∗
(
x⇒¬(F ∨G))]−→ τ1[A ∗(x⇒¬F)]∧ τ1[A ∗(x⇒¬G)]
τ1
[
A ∗(x⇒¬¬F)]−→ τ1[A ∗(x⇒ F)].
Complex subformulae that appear within the scope of any temporal or modal operators are
renamed as follows (where v, y and z are all new propositions and P is either A or E but
is the same on both sides of the transformation).
τ1
[
A ∗(x⇒ BiF )
]−→ τ1[A ∗(x⇒ Biy)]
∧ τ1
[
A ∗(y⇒ F)] F not a literal.
τ1
[
A ∗(x⇒¬BiF )
]−→ τ1[A ∗(x⇒¬Bi¬y)]
∧ τ1
[
A ∗(y⇒¬F)] F not a literal.
τ1
[
A ∗(x⇒ P F)]−→ A ∗(x⇒ P y)∧ τ1[A ∗(y⇒ F)]
F neither a literal nor a disjunction of literals.
τ1
[
A ∗(x⇒¬A F)]−→A ∗(x⇒ E y)∧ τ1[A ∗(y⇒¬F)]
τ1
[
A ∗(x⇒¬E F)]−→ A ∗(x⇒A y)∧ τ1[A ∗(y⇒¬F)]
τ1
[
A ∗(x⇒ P F)]−→ τ1[A ∗(x⇒ P y)]
∧ τ1
[
A ∗(y⇒ F)] F not a literal.
τ1
[
A ∗(x⇒¬A F)]−→ A ∗(x⇒ E♦y)∧ τ1[A ∗(y⇒¬F)]
τ1
[
A ∗(x⇒¬E F)]−→A ∗(x⇒A♦y)∧ τ1[A ∗(y⇒¬F)]
τ1
[
A ∗(x⇒ P♦F)]−→A ∗(x⇒ P♦y)
∧ τ1
[
A ∗(y⇒ F)] F not a literal.
τ1
[
A ∗(x⇒¬A♦F)]−→ τ1[A ∗(x⇒ E y)]∧ τ1[A ∗(y⇒¬F)]
τ1
[
A ∗(x⇒¬E♦F)]−→ τ1[A ∗(x⇒A y)]∧ τ1[A ∗(y⇒¬F)]
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τ1
[
A ∗
(
x⇒ P(F UG))]−→ τ1[A ∗(x⇒ P(y UG))]
∧ τ1
[
A ∗(y⇒ F)] F not a literal.
τ1
[
A ∗
(
x⇒ P(F UG))]−→ τ1[A ∗(x⇒ P(F U y))]
∧ τ1
[
A ∗(y⇒G)] G not a literal.
τ1
[
A ∗
(
x⇒¬A(F UG))]−→ τ1[A ∗(x⇒ E(yW v))]∧ τ1[ (y⇒¬G)]
∧ τ1
[
A ∗
(
v⇒ (y ∧ z))]∧ τ1[ (z⇒¬F)]
τ1
[
A ∗
(
x⇒¬E(F UG))]−→ τ1[A ∗(x⇒A(yW v))]∧ τ1[ (y⇒¬G)]
∧ τ1
[
A ∗
(
v⇒ (y ∧ z))]∧ τ1[ (z⇒¬F)]
τ1
[
A ∗
(
x⇒ P(FWG))]−→ τ1[A ∗(x⇒ P(yWG))]
∧ τ1
[
A ∗(y⇒ F)] F not a literal.
τ1
[
A ∗
(
x⇒ P(FWG))]−→ τ1[A ∗(x⇒ P(FW y))]
∧ τ1
[
A ∗(y⇒G)] G not a literal.
τ1
[
A ∗
(
x⇒¬A(FWG))]−→ τ1[A ∗(x⇒ E(y U v))]∧ τ1[ (y⇒¬G)]
∧ τ1
[
A ∗
(
v⇒ (y ∧ z))]∧ τ1[ (z⇒¬F)]
τ1
[
A ∗
(
x⇒¬E(FWG))]−→ τ1[A ∗(x⇒A(y U v))]∧ τ1[ (y⇒¬G)]
∧ τ1
[
A ∗
(
v⇒ (y ∧ z))]∧ τ1[ (z⇒¬F)].
The translations for ¬P(F UG) and ¬P(FWG) are obtained by applying the negation
equivalences for these formulae given in Section 2, renaming ¬G by y and ¬F by z and
the conjunction y ∧ z by v. Then, any temporal operators that do not occur in the normal
form, applied to literals, are removed as follows (where y and z are new propositions, l, m
are literals and P is either A or E but is the same on both sides of the transformation).
τ1
[
A ∗(x⇒ P l)] −→ τ1[A ∗(x⇒ (l ∧ y))]
∧ τ1
[
A ∗
(
y⇒ P (y ∧ l))]
τ1
[
A ∗
(
x⇒A(l U m))] −→ A ∗(x⇒A♦m)∧ τ1[A ∗(x⇒ z)]
∧ τ1
[
A ∗
(
z⇒ (m∨ (l ∧ y)))]
∧A ∗(y⇒A z)
τ1
[
A ∗
(
x⇒ E(l U m))] −→ A ∗(x⇒ E♦m〈cj〉)∧ τ1[A ∗(x⇒ z)]
∧ τ1
[
A ∗
(
z⇒ (m∨ (l ∧ y)))]
∧A ∗(y⇒ E z〈cj〉) 〈cj〉 is new.
τ1
[
A ∗
(
x⇒ P(lWm))] −→ τ1[A ∗(x⇒ z)]
∧ τ1
[
A ∗
(
z⇒ (m∨ (l ∧ y)))]
∧A ∗(y⇒ P z)
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Next, we use renaming on formulae whose right hand side has disjunction as its main
operator but may not be in the correct form, where y is a new proposition and D is a
disjunction of formulae.
τ1
[
A ∗(x⇒D ∨ F)] −→ τ1[A ∗(x⇒D ∨ y)]∧ τ1[A ∗(y⇒ F)]
F neither a literal nor a modal literal,
nor a disjunction of literals and modal literals.
τ1
[
A ∗(x⇒D ∨BiF )
] −→ τ1[A ∗(x⇒D ∨ y)]∧ τ1[A ∗(y⇒ BiF )]
D contains a disjunction of the form BjG
or ¬BjG where i = j.
τ1
[
A ∗(x⇒D ∨¬BiF )
] −→ τ1[A ∗(x⇒D ∨ y)]∧ τ1[A ∗(y⇒¬BiF )]
D contains a disjunction of the form BjG
or ¬BjG where i = j .
τ1
[
A ∗(x⇒D ∨BiF )
] −→ τ1[A ∗(x⇒D ∨Biy)]∧ τ1[A ∗(y⇒ F)]
F not a literal.
τ1
[
A ∗(x⇒D ∨¬Bi¬F)
] −→ τ1[A ∗(x⇒D ∨¬Bi¬y)]
∧ τ1
[
A ∗(y⇒ F)] F is not a literal.
Recall from the definition of SNFB each belief clause may only contain modal literals
involving one modal operator, i.e., true⇒ B1x∨y∨¬B1z is allowed as the modal literals
only contain one modal operator B1 but true ⇒ B1x ∨ y ∨ ¬B2z is not allowed as it
contains both modal operators B1 and B2. The second transformation in the above group
renames a disjunct BiF that involves a different modal operator to another disjunct in
D (the third transformation is similar). The fourth transformation in the group renames
F from disjunct BiF where F is not a literal (the fifth is similar). Finally, we rewrite
formulae containing no temporal operators whose right hand side is a disjunction of literals
or modal literals into clause form and stop applying the transformation to clauses already
in the correct form.
τ1
[
A ∗(x⇒D)] −→ A ∗(true⇒ (¬x ∨D))
D literal or modal literal or disjunction of literals and
modal literals only involving one modal operator.
τ1
[
A ∗(x⇒A♦l)]−→ A ∗(x⇒A♦l) l is a literal.
τ1
[
A ∗(x⇒ E♦l)]−→ A ∗(x⇒E♦l〈cj〉) l is a literal and 〈cj〉 is new.
τ1
[
A ∗(x⇒ E♦l〈cj〉)]−→ A ∗(x⇒ E♦l〈cj〉) l is a literal.
τ1
[
A ∗
(
x⇒A (l1 ∨ · · · ∨ ln)
)]−→ A ∗(x⇒A (l1 ∨ · · · ∨ ln))
each li is a literal.
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τ1
[
A ∗
(
x⇒ E (l1 ∨ · · · ∨ ln)
)] −→ A ∗(x⇒ E (l1 ∨ · · · ∨ ln)〈cj〉)
each li is a literal and 〈cj〉 is new.
τ1
[
A ∗(x⇒ E (l1 ∨ · · · ∨ ln)〈cj〉)
] −→ A ∗(x⇒ E (l1 ∨ · · · ∨ ln)〈cj〉)
each li is a literal.
Thus, the above transformations are applied until the formula is in the form∧
i
A ∗Fi
where each Fi is one of the required formats. This, in turn, is equivalent to
A ∗
∧
i
Fi.
5. Resolution for temporal logic of possible belief
Here we consider the resolution rules for the temporal logic of belief BB(1). To simplify
notation we shall write the single modal operator B1 as B . The extension of this system
into its multi-modal version is considered in Section 8.
The resolution rules presented are split into four groups, initial resolution, modal
resolution, step resolution and temporal resolution. The first three types of resolution are
variants of classical resolution. Temporal resolution, however, is an extension allowing
the resolution between formulae such as p with ♦¬p on the same path. The step and
temporal resolution rules for CTL were presented in [9]. Here, as we allow literal clauses
there are some minor differences.
5.1. Initial resolution
A literal clause may be resolved with an initial clause or two initial clauses may be
resolved together as follows
[IRES1]
true ⇒ (F ∨ l)
start ⇒ (G∨¬l)
start ⇒ (F ∨G)
[IRES2]
start ⇒ (F ∨ l)
start ⇒ (G∨¬l)
start ⇒ (F ∨G)
where F is a disjunction of literals.
5.2. Modal resolution
During modal resolution we apply the following rules which are based on the modal
resolution system introduced by Mints [35]. Firstly we are allowed to resolve a literal or
modal literal and its negation or we can resolve the formulae Bl and B¬l as we cannot
believe something and believe its negation.
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[MRES1]
true ⇒ D ∨m
true ⇒ D′ ∨ ¬m
true ⇒ D ∨D′
[MRES2]
true ⇒ D ∨Bl
true ⇒ D′ ∨B¬l
true ⇒ D ∨D′
Also we have the following rules which involve pushing the external B operator into one
of the clauses to allow us to resolve, for example, ¬Bl with l
[MRES4a]
true ⇒ D ∨¬Bl
true ⇒ D′ ∨ l
true ⇒ D ∨mod (D′)
[MRES4b]
true ⇒ D ∨Bl
true ⇒ D′ ∨ ¬l
true ⇒ D ∨mod (D′)
where mod (D′) is defined below.
Definition 12. The function mod (D), defined on disjunctions of literals or modal literals
D, is given as follows.
mod (F ∨G)=mod (F )∨mod (G)
mod (Bl)= Bl
mod (¬Bl)=¬Bl
mod (l)=¬B¬l.
These last two resolution operations require explanation. We explain the motivation
behind MRES4a below; the justification for MRES4b is similar. Recall that there is an
implicit B operator surrounding each clause as each clause is surrounded by A ∗. We are
resolving the first clause in MRES4a, as it is, with the second clause having distributed the
external B over the implication. Thus, when we resolve ¬Bl with Bl, we must adjust the
other disjuncts of the second clause to show that B has been distributed. In more detail we
consider the right hand sides of the clauses given, i.e., D ∨¬Bl and D′ ∨ l. Rewriting as
implications we have ¬D⇒¬Bl and ¬D′ ⇒ l. As each of these belief or literal clauses
is surrounded by an implicit B operator, the second clause can be rewritten as B(¬D′ ⇒ l)
and, hence, B¬D′ ⇒ Bl. Now D′ is a disjunction of modal literals or literals, i.e.,
D′ =m1∨m2∨· · · so B¬D′ = B¬m1∧B¬m2∧· · · . Thus we can resolve the¬Bl andBl
on the right hand side of the implication obtaining ¬D ∧ (B¬m1 ∧B¬m2 ∧ · · ·)⇒ false.
Rewriting as a disjunction we have D∨¬B¬m1 ∨¬B¬m2 ∨ · · · . Since in KD45 we have
theorems (1) and (2) given in Section 2.2, we can delete ¬B¬ from any of the disjuncts
mi that are modal literals and obtain the required resolvent. The equivalences (1) and (2)
ensure that following translation to normal form the application of any resolution rules to a
pair of clauses results in a clause where each disjunct contains at most one explicit modal
operator.
5.3. Step resolution
‘Step’ resolution consists of the application of standard classical resolution to formulae
representing constraints at a particular moment in time, together with simplification rules
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for transferring contradictions within states to constraints on all states. Simplification and
subsumption rules are also applied.
Pairs of step clauses may be resolved using the following (step resolution) rules.
[SRES1]
P ⇒ A (F ∨ l)
Q ⇒ A (G∨¬l)
(P ∧Q) ⇒ A (F ∨G)
[SRES2]
P ⇒ E (F ∨ l)〈cj〉
Q ⇒ A (G∨¬l)
(P ∧Q) ⇒ E (F ∨G)〈cj〉
[SRES3]
P ⇒ E (F ∨ l)〈cj〉
Q ⇒ E (G∨¬l)〈cj〉
(P ∧Q) ⇒ E (F ∨G)〈cj〉
A step clause may be resolved with a literal clause (where G is a disjunction of literals)
and any label is carried to the resolvent.
[SRES4]
P ⇒ A (F ∨ l)
true ⇒ (G∨¬l)
P ⇒ A (F ∨G)
P ⇒ E (F ∨ l)〈cj〉
true ⇒ (G∨¬l)
P ⇒ E (F ∨G)〈cj〉
Once a contradiction within a state is found, the following rule can be used to generate
extra global constraints.
[SRES5] Q ⇒ P
false
true ⇒ ¬Q
where P is either path operator (the clause in the antecedent being labelled if P was the E
operator). This rule states that if, by satisfying P in the last moment in time a contradiction
is produced, then P must never be satisfied in any moment in time. The new constraint
therefore represents A ∗¬Q.
5.4. Termination
Each cycle of initial, modal or step resolution terminates when either no new resolvents
are derived, or false is derived in the form of either start ⇒ false or true⇒ false.
5.5. Temporal resolution
During temporal resolution the aim is to resolve one of the sometime clauses, Q⇒
P♦l, with a set of clauses that together imply ¬l along the same path, for example a set
of clauses that together have the effect of F ⇒ A A ¬l or possibly F ⇒ E E ¬l.
However the interaction between the ‘ ’ and ‘ ’ operators in BBn makes the definition
of such a rule non-trivial and further the translation from BBn to SNFB will have removed
all but the outer level of -operators. So, resolution will be between a sometime clause
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and a set of clauses that together imply an -formula that occurs on the same path, which
will contradict the ♦-clause.
[TRES1]
P ⇒ A A ¬l
Q ⇒ A♦l
Q ⇒ A(¬PW l)
[TRES2]
P ⇒ A A ¬l
Q ⇒ E♦l〈cj〉
Q ⇒ E(¬PW l)〈cj〉
[TRES3]
P ⇒ E E ¬l〈cj〉
Q ⇒ A♦l
Q ⇒ A(¬PW l)
[TRES4]
P ⇒ E E ¬l〈cj〉
Q ⇒ E♦l〈cj〉
Q ⇒ E(¬PW l)〈cj〉
In each case the resolvent ensures that once Q has been satisfied, meaning that the
eventuality ♦l must be satisfied on some or all paths, the conditions for triggering a
-formula are not allowed to occur, i.e., either P must be false at every future moment or
must be false until the eventuality (l) has been satisfied. It may be surprising that resolving
an A-formula with an E-formula in TRES3 results in an A-formula. This is because the
eventuality l must appear on all paths so similarly the resolvent will also hold on all paths.
Here the label 〈cj〉 on all formulae are limit closure labels. As we see below formulae of the
form E E ¬l〈cj〉 are constructed from one or more merged step clauses, for example
a ⇒ E (a ∧ ¬l)〈cj〉. The timeline that traces out E (a ∧ ¬l) in every next moment
satisfies the definition of a limit closure timeline. Similarly the resolvent is rewritten into
several step clauses labelled where appropriate by 〈cj〉.
As there are no clauses of the formA⇒ P P l the full temporal resolution operation
applies between a P sometime clause and a set of merged clauses that together imply
A⇒ P P ¬l. For example the temporal resolution operation, in detail for TRES3, is
F0 ⇒ P0 G0
. . . ⇒ . . .
Fn ⇒ Pn Gn
Q ⇒ A♦l
Q ⇒ A
[ n∧
i=0
(¬Fi)
]
W l
with the side conditions that
Gi ⇒¬l for all i, 0 i  n; and
Gi ⇒
n∨
j=0
Fj for all i, 0 i  n,
where each Pi is either A or E (where E step clauses are labelled) and at least one Pi is E
(otherwise it is an A loop and we apply TRES1). The set of merged clauses Fi ⇒ P Gi
that satisfy these side conditions are together known as an E loop in l. The disjunction
of the left hand side of this set of clauses, i.e.,
∨
i Fi is known as an E loop formula for
l. The most complex part of this approach is the search for the set of clauses to use in
the application of the temporal resolution operation. Detailed explanation of techniques
developed for this search is beyond the scope of this paper but is discussed at length for
PTL in [12,13] and CTL in [7].
The resolvent must be translated into the normal form before any further resolution steps
can be applied. A translation to the normal form is given below that avoids the renaming
of the subformula
∧n
i=0¬Fi .
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true⇒ (¬Q∨ l ∨¬Fi) (3)
true⇒ (¬Q∨ l ∨ t) (4)
t ⇒ P (l ∨¬Fi) (5)
t ⇒ P (l ∨ t). (6)
Thus, we only introduce one new proposition symbol t which we see later (in Section 5.7)
can be introduced at the start of the proof. This is important for the termination as once
the relevant new propositions t have been introduced we require no new propositions to be
introduced during the proof. In the above there are n+ 1 copies of the clauses (3) and (5),
one for each Fi , i = 0, . . . , n. Also P will be A for resolvents of TRES1 and TRES3 and
E for resolvents of TRES2 and TRES4 (and the relevant clauses will be labelled with the
same label as the E sometime clause in the premise). We note that only the resolvents (3)
and (5) depend on the particular loop being resolved with, i.e., contain a reference to Fi .
5.6. Subsumption and simplification
In addition to normal classical simplification of the conjunctions of literals on the left
hand sides of clauses and disjunctions of literals or modal literals on the right hand sides
of clauses we can perform additional simplification due to the axioms of KD45 such as the
following.
Bl∧ F ∧B¬l ∧G→ false
¬Bl∨ F ∨¬B¬l ∨G→ true
Bl∨ F ∨¬B¬l ∨G→¬B¬l ∨ F ∨G
Bl∧ F ∧¬B¬l ∧B→ Bl∧ F ∧G.
Subsumption also forms part of the step resolution process. Here, as in classical
resolution, a clause may be removed from the clause set if it is subsumed by another clause
already present. Subsumption may be expressed as the following operation.{
C ⇒ A
D ⇒ B
}
C⇒D B⇒A {D⇒ B}.
The side conditions  C⇒D and  B ⇒ A must hold before this subsumption step can
be applied and, in this case, the clause C⇒A can be deleted without losing information.
5.7. Augmentation
The introduction of new propositions, such as t in Section 5.5, during the proof, makes
proofs about the resolution method difficult. Furthermore, if a resolution proof involves
two temporal resolution inferences involving the same literal, we would introduce two
new propositions where one would suffice. Thus for n different eventualities we only
require n new propositions. Given an eventuality P♦l, the new proposition introduced
is wl (rather than t above) thought of as waiting for l. Thus we introduce a proposition
wl for each literal occurring on the right hand side of a sometime rule in a systematic
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way, that is used in the translation of the resolvents from temporal resolution into SNFB .
We introduce these new propositions at the start of the proof by adding the resolvents that
have no reference to the loop detected (i.e., the clauses above labelled (4) and (6) which
do not contain ¬Fi ) at the beginning and the rest of the clauses as the proof proceeds.
The following definitions formalise this technique and is known as augmentation. Hence
having translated to SNFB and augmented, no new propositions or labels appear during the
application of the resolution rules.
Definition 13 (Augmented SNFB clause sets). Given a set, S, of SNFB clauses, we
construct an augmented set of clauses Aug(S) as follows. For each literal l which occurs
as an eventuality in S we introduce a new proposition, wl , and record the correspondence
between l and wl . The variable wl will be used to record the condition that we are waiting
for l to occur.
Thus for each sometime clause Q⇒A♦l the defining clauses for wl are
wl ⇒A (l ∨wl) (7)
true⇒ (¬Q∨ l ∨wl) (8)
and for each sometime clause Q⇒ E♦l〈cj〉 the defining clauses for wl are
wl ⇒ E (l ∨wl)〈cj〉 (9)
true⇒ (¬Q∨ l ∨wl). (10)
Definition 14. The loop resolvents for an A sometime clauseQ⇒A♦l and a loop formula∨
i Fi are
true⇒ (¬Q∨ l ∨¬Fi) (11)
wl ⇒A (l ∨¬Fi) (12)
and the loop resolvents for an E sometime clause Q⇒ E♦l〈cj〉 and a loop formula ∨i Fi
are
true⇒ (¬Q∨ l ∨¬Fi) (13)
wl ⇒ E (l ∨¬Fi)〈cj〉. (14)
In summary, to apply one of the temporal resolution rules we must search for a set of
merged clauses Fi ⇒ P Gi such that ∨i Fi ⇒ P P ¬l corresponding to the relevant
TRES rule (where ∨i Fi is known as a loop formula for ¬l).
5.8. Resolution method algorithm
Given any BBn formula, F , to be tested for unsatisfiability, the following steps are
performed.
(1) Translate F into SNFB , giving Fs .
(2) Augment Fs , giving Aug(Fs).
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(3) Perform initial, modal and step resolution (including simplification and subsumption)
on Aug(Fs) until either
(a) start ⇒ false is derived—terminate noting that F is unsatisfiable; or
(b) no new resolvents are generated—continue to step (4).
(4) Select an eventuality from the right hand side of a sometime clause within Aug(Fs),
for example ♦l. Search for loop formulae for ¬l with which we can apply a temporal
resolution rule.
(5) Construct loop resolvents for the loop formulae detected and each relevant sometime
clause with ♦l on the right hand side. If any new formulae (i.e., that are not subsumed
by SNFB clauses already present) have been generated, go to step (3).
(6) If all eventualities have been resolved, i.e., no new formulae have been generated for
any of the eventualities, terminate declaring F satisfiable; otherwise go to step (4).
6. Examples
We consider two simple examples that can be represented within this logic. The first
one shows how actions, plans and goals can be represented, while the second exhibits a
refutation derived for a specific scenario.
6.1. Representing aspects of rational agency
The key aspects of agent theories, such as KARO [44] are to be able to represent an
agents beliefs and its actions. Representing beliefs in our framework is simple; representing
actions is also relatively easy. For example, if a particular action, α, has a certain pre-
requisite, pre, and an effect post, then we can represent the action by
pre ⇒ A (done(α)⇒ post).
Thus, if pre is satisfied in a state, then in all successor states where α has been done, then
post is satisfied. Similarly, we can represent the fact that an action can not be undertaken
is its precondition is not satisfied:
¬pre ⇒ A ¬done(α).
In order to simply state the planning problem, we could use
start ⇒ E♦goal
or, more realistically, use the following which states that the goal can be reached by
undertaking a sequence of actions (taken from a finite set).
start ⇒ E((∃a. done(a))U goal).
In addition, we can represent the fact that an agent has beliefs about the actions it can
perform, for example
BiE done(α).
Note while these examples have been written using first-order syntax, as long as the set
of actions is finite they can be rewritten as propositional BBn formulae. Many further
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examples of this form can be given, and properties of specifications of rational agents
can be given (see, for example, [23]).
6.2. Belief about possibilities
Consider the formula (partially translated into the normal form).
BE oxygen ∧ BA♦hydrogen ∧ A ∗
[
safe ⇒ A ¬explode ∧
(hydrogen∧ oxygen) ⇒ explode
]
characterising the statement
“I believe that in some possible future there will always be oxygen and I believe that
in all possible futures, hydrogen will occur sometime. If something is safe then it will
never explode and if hydrogen and oxygen occur together then they will explode.”
Now, we characterise this as a set of SNFB clauses and show that these contradict with the
belief of safety Bsafe. The set of SNFB clauses generated is
1. start ⇒ a
2. true ⇒ ¬a ∨Bsafe
3. true ⇒ ¬safe∨¬explode
4. true ⇒ ¬safe∨ x
5. x ⇒ A ¬explode
6. x ⇒ A x
7. true ⇒ ¬a ∨Bz
8. true ⇒ ¬z∨ oxygen
9. true ⇒ ¬z∨w
10. w ⇒ E oxygen〈ci〉
11. w ⇒ E w〈ci〉
12. true ⇒ ¬a ∨ Bb
13. b ⇒ A♦hydrogen
14. true ⇒ (¬hydrogen ∨ ¬oxygen ∨ explode).
Statements 1 and 2 evolve from the Bsafe (a is a new proposition used to rename Bsafe,
BE oxygen and BA♦hydrogen), 3–6 are from safe ⇒ A ¬explode, 7–11 are from
BE oxygen, 12 and 13 are from BA♦hydrogen and 14 is from (hydrogen∧ oxygen) ⇒
explode. Next we augment the set of clauses with the following:-
15. whydrogen ⇒ A (hydrogen∨whydrogen)
16. true ⇒ (¬b ∨ hydrogen∨whydrogen).
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The refutation now proceeds as follows
17. x ⇒ A (¬hydrogen∨¬oxygen) [5,14, SRES4]
18. (w ∧ x) ⇒ E ¬hydrogen〈ci〉 [10,17, SRES2].
Merging clauses 6, 11 and 18 we obtain
x ∧w⇒ E (x ∧w ∧¬hydrogen)〈ci〉
for resolution with clause 13 giving the following resolvent.
19. b ⇒ A(¬(w ∧ x)W hydrogen) [6,11,13,18, TRES3].
In rewriting 19 into SNFB , one of the clauses (i.e., the loop resolvent (11) from Section 5.7)
we get is
20. true ⇒ (¬b ∨ hydrogen ∨ ¬w ∨ ¬x) [19]
from which the refutation continues as follows.
21. true ⇒ (¬b ∨¬oxygen ∨ explode∨¬w ∨ ¬x) [14,20, MRES1]
22. true ⇒ (¬safe∨¬b ∨¬oxygen∨¬w ∨ ¬x) [3,21, MRES1]
23. true ⇒ (¬safe∨¬b ∨¬oxygen∨¬w) [4,22, MRES1]
24. true ⇒ (¬safe∨¬z∨¬b ∨¬w) [8,23, MRES1]
25. true ⇒ (¬safe∨¬z∨¬b) [9,24, MRES1]
26. true ⇒ (¬a ∨¬Bsafe∨¬Bz) [12,25, MRES4b]
27. true ⇒ (¬a ∨¬Bsafe) [7,26, MRES1]
28. true ⇒ ¬a [2,27, MRES1]
29. start ⇒ false [1,28, IRES1].
7. Soundness, completeness and termination
Firstly we can show that the transformation into SNFB preserves satisfiability.
Theorem 15. A BBn formula A is satisfiable if, and only if, τ0[A] is satisfiable.
Proof. Proofs analogous to those in [6,17,25] will suffice. ✷
Next we show that augmenting the clause set preserves satisfiability. We will show that an
augmented clause set has a model if and only if its underlying (non-augmented) clause set
has a model.
Definition 16. Given a set, S, of SNFB clauses, a normal model for the augmented clause
set for S is a model which satisfies the formula
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(
wl ⇔ (¬l ∧A♦l)) (15)
for each literal l which occurs as an eventuality in an A sometime clause in S and
(
wl ⇔ (¬l ∧ E♦l〈cj〉)) (16)
for each literal l which occurs as an eventuality in an E sometime clause in S labelled
by 〈cj〉.
Definition 17. An augmented clause set is said to be well-behaved if it is either
unsatisfiable or has a normal model.
Lemma 18 (Augmentation). If S is a set of SNFB clauses then
(1) Aug(S) is well-behaved, and,
(2) Aug(S) has a model if and only if S has a model.
Proof. If Aug(S) has a model then, ignoring the value of each wl at each moment gives
a model for S. Conversely, if S has a model M , then M can be extended to a model M ′
for Aug(S) by giving wl the same truth value as ¬l ∧ A♦l in M in each state, and for
each literal l on the right hand side of an A sometime clause and the same truth value
as ¬l ∧ E♦l〈cj〉 in M in each state, and for each literal l on the right hand side of an E
sometime clause labelled by 〈cj〉. The model M ′ clearly satisfies the formulae (7), (8), (9)
and (10) from Section 5.7 and (15) and (16) above. The lemma follows easily from these
two observations. ✷
Lemma 19 (Soundness—initial, step and modal resolution). Let S be a set of SNFB
clauses. Let the clause set T be obtained from S by the application of an initial, step
or modal resolution inference. Then S is satisfiable if and only if T is satisfiable.
Proof. We prove soundness of the modal resolution rule MRES2. The other rules are
similar. Assume the clauses true ⇒ D ∨ Bl and true ⇒ D′ ∨ B¬l are in S and that
S is satisfiable. Let T be obtained by applying MRES2 to true ⇒ D ∨ Bl and true ⇒
D′ ∨ B¬l, i.e., T = S ∪ {true ⇒ D ∨ D′}. As S is satisfiable there must be a model
M that satisfies S. We show M also satisfies T . Take any point (t, j) in M . Thus
〈M,(t, j)〉 |=D∨Bl and 〈M,(t, j)〉 |=D′ ∨B¬l. From the semantics of disjunction either
〈M,(t, j)〉 |= D or 〈M,(t, j)〉 |= Bl. If the former then 〈M,(t, j)〉 |= D ∨ D′ and thus
〈M,(t, j)〉 |= true ⇒ D ∨D′ and we are done. Otherwise assume that 〈M,(t, j)〉 |= D
and 〈M,(t, j)〉 |= Bl. Hence 〈M,(t, j)〉 |= ¬B¬l from axiom D. Thus from the semantics
of negation 〈M,(t, j)〉 |= B¬l. Thus 〈M,(t, j)〉 |= D′ and therefore from the semantics
of disjunction 〈M,(t, j)〉 |=D ∨D′ and 〈M,(t, j)〉 |= true⇒D ∨D′ as required. If S is
unsatisfiable then by adding true⇒D ∨D′ to obtain T , T is still unsatisfiable. ✷
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Lemma 20 (Soundness—temporal resolution). Let S be a well-behaved augmented clause
set. Let the clause set T be obtained from S by application of the temporal resolution
operation. Then
(1) T is well-behaved, and,
(2) S is satisfiable iff T is satisfiable.
Proof. If S is satisfiable so S has a model, then by Definition 17 it has a normal model
M . The side conditions for temporal resolution guarantee that the loop resolvents, i.e.,
formulae (11) and (12) (or (13) and (14) respectively) given in Section 5.7 hold in M , and
so M is a (normal) model for T , i.e., T is satisfiable. If S is unsatisfiable then the addition
of clauses to produce T is also unsatisfiable. Hence T is well-behaved. ✷
Theorem 21 (Soundness). Given a satisfiable set of SNFB clauses S, if T is obtained by
applying a resolution rule then S is satisfiable iff T is satisfiable.
Proof. Lemma 18 shows augmentation preserves satisfiability, i.e., S is satisfiable iff
Aug(S) is satisfiable. In the following assume S is augmented. Lemma 19 shows that S
is satisfiable iff T is satisfiable if T is obtained from S by the application of an initial,
modal or step resolution rule. Lemma 20 shows that S is satisfiable iff T is satisfiable if
T is obtained from S by the application of a temporal resolution rule. Hence the theorem
follows. ✷
Theorem 22 (Termination). The resolution method applied to a set of SNFB clauses will
terminate.
Proof. We do not need any new labels during the proof (these are fixed after the translation
into SNFB ) and by augmenting the clause set similarly we do not require any new
propositions during the proof. Hence, modulo ordering of the literals, there are a finite
number of right and left hand sides of each type of clause. Hence either we terminate
having derived a contradiction or we can generate no new clauses. ✷
7.1. Completeness
The proof of completeness is based on that given in [25]. We construct a graph of the
set of SNFB clauses that has two types of edges representing the modal and temporal
dimensions. Temporal edges may be labelled with a set of labels to capture the movement
from one state to another by satisfying a labelled E step clause. We show that an empty
graph corresponds to an unsatisfiable set of clauses and then that an unsatisfiable set of
clauses has a refutation by the resolution method presented in this paper.
Graph construction
Definition 23 (Labelled behaviour graph). Let T be a set of augmented SNFB clauses
and LAB be the set of labels labelling E sometime clauses and E step clauses in T .
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Given T , we construct a finite directed graph H = (N,EB,ET ), for T where N is
the set of nodes, EB ⊆ (N × N) is the set of modal edges representing belief, and
ET ⊆ (N ×P(LAB)×N) is the set of labelled temporal edges (where P(LAB) denotes
the powerset of the set of labels). A node, n = (V ,YA, YE), in H is a triple where V ,
YA and YE are constructed as follows. For any proposition p occurring in T , V contains
(consistent) subsets of all the literals or modal literals that can be constructed from p,
namely the formulae {p,¬p,Bp,¬Bp,B¬p,¬B¬p}. Thus we construct all possible sets
of formulae containing p or its negation,Bp or its negation, and B¬p or its negation. Next
we reduce the number of these sets that we must consider by using the axioms of KD45.
Thus we cannot have a set containing Bp and B¬p as from the D axiom Bp⇒¬B¬p
which contradicts with B¬p. For each proposition p ∈ T this leaves the following six sets
Vp =
{{Bp,¬B¬p,p}, {Bp,¬B¬p,¬p}, {B¬p,¬Bp,p}, {B¬p,¬Bp,¬p},
{¬B¬p,¬Bp,p}, {¬B¬p,¬Bp,¬p}}.
To construct V we take the union of a member of each Vp for each proposition p in T , i.e.,
V =
⋃
p∈T
a ∈ Vp.
Nodes are triples (V ,YA, YE) where YA is a subset of the literals that occur on the right
hand side of A sometime clauses in T and YE is a subset of {l〈cj〉 |Q⇒ E♦l〈cj〉 ∈ T }. That
is YE contains labelled literals of the form l〈cj〉 where l is a literal that occurs on the right
hand side of an E sometime clause in T and 〈cj〉 is the label of that clause. Informally
YA contains currently unsatisfied eventualities of the A sometime clauses and YE contains
unsatisfied eventualities of the E sometime clauses that have been labelled by the relevant
label.
Delete any node n= (V ,YA, YE) such that for some belief clause of the form
true⇒
∨
i
mi
there is no mi such that mi ∈ V . Informally this step deletes any nodes that do not
immediately satisfy the set of belief clauses.
Next we push the externalB operator (from the A ∗ operator surrounding each clause)
into each clause and delete nodes that do not satisfy the new set of clauses. Consider any
literal clause whose right hand side consists of a single literal, for example true ⇒ l. By
pushing in the external B-operator this clause is equivalent to true ⇒ Bl so we delete
any nodes where Bl is not satisfied. Next consider any belief clause whose right hand
side consists of a single literal disjoined with one or more modal literals, for example
true ⇒ l ∨ Ba ∨ ¬Bb ∨ ¬Bc. By pushing in the external B-operator this clause is
equivalent to true⇒ Bl ∨Ba ∨¬Bb ∨¬Bc so any node that does not satisfy this clause
is deleted (recall in KD45 ¬BB¬p⇔¬B¬p and Bp⇔¬B¬Bp). Note we could also
obtain true⇒¬B¬l∨Ba∨¬Bb∨¬Bc but as the original clause implies this clause (i.e.,
the original clause subsumes this clause) we ignore it. Finally consider a belief clause with
more than one literal disjoined on the right hand side, for example true ⇒ l1 ∨ l2 ∨ Ba.
We must consider all possible ways of pushing in the B operator into this clause obtaining
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true⇒ Bl1 ∨¬B¬l2 ∨Ba or true ⇒¬B¬l1 ∨Bl2 ∨Ba. Nodes that don’t satisfy these
additional clauses are deleted.
Next delete any nodes (V ,YA, YE) such that for any A sometime clause Q⇒A♦l it is
not the case that if V |=Q then l ∈ YA. Similarly delete any nodes (V ,YA, YE) such that
for any E sometime clause Q⇒ E♦l〈cj〉 it is not the case that if V |=Q then l〈cj〉 ∈ YE.
Informally if the left hand side of a A (respectively E) sometime clause is satisfied then the
eventuality must be contained in the set of A (respectively E) eventualities in that node.
Next we construct the belief edges (EB edges) between the undeleted nodes as follows.
Given node, n = (V ,YA, YE), we construct EB edges to any node n′ = (V ′, Y ′A, Y ′E) as
follows:
(1) if Bl ∈ V then V ′ |= l (i.e., V ′ |= B_set (V )); and
(2) Bl ∈ V ⇔ Bl ∈ V ′ and ¬Bl ∈ V ⇔¬Bl ∈ V ′ for each literal l.
Step 1 ensures that for any modal literal in V of the form Bl, l is satisfied in V ′ and in
step 2 that the set of modal literals in both nodes remains the same.
Now we construct the temporal edges. Given a node n = (V ,YA, YE), let X be the
largest subset of the A step clauses such that V satisfies the literals on the left hand sides of
each clause. Let C be the set of right hand sides of the clauses in X having deleted the A 
operators. Note if V does not satisfy the left hand side of any A step clauses (i.e., X = ∅)
there are no constraints from the A step clauses on the next state so C = true. Let RE be
the largest set of E step clauses of T such that V satisfies the left hand side. Let REI
′ ⊆RE
be the set of E step clauses {F ⇒ E G〈cj〉 ∈ RE | 〈cj〉 ∈ I ′}. For each I ′ ⊆ LAB let CI ′
be the set right hand sides of the clauses in REI
′
having deleted the E operators. As with
the A step clauses if this set is empty CI ′ = true.
Let V ′ be a set of literals and modal literals from a node in H that satisfies C ∪ CI ′ ,
i.e., V ′ satisfies the right hand sides of the clauses in X ∪ REI ′ . Let Y ′A ⊆ YA be the
set of literals in YA not satisfied by V . Let Y ′′A be the set of literals obtained from the
right hand side of the A sometimes clauses where V ′ satisfies the left hand side. Let
Y ′′′A = Y ′A ∪ Y ′′A. Informally Y ′′′A keeps track of unsatisfied eventualities, i.e., Y ′A, those
remaining unsatisfied by V plus Y ′′A, new eventualities triggered by V ′. Similarly let
Y ′E ⊆ YE be the set of labelled literals labelled by a member of I ′ not satisfied by V (i.e.,
l〈cj〉 ∈ Y ′E iff (l〈cj〉 ∈ YE) ∧ (〈cj〉 ∈ I ′) ∧ (l /∈ V )). Let Y ′′E be the set of labelled literals
obtained from the right hand side of E sometime clauses where V ′ satisfies the left hand
side. As before let Y ′′′E = Y ′E ∪ Y ′′E where Y ′′′E keeps track of unsatisfied eventualities for a
subset of labels I ′, i.e., Y ′E, those labelled by a member of I
′ remaining unsatisfied by V
plus Y ′′E , new sometime eventualities triggered by V ′. Edges labelled by I ′ are constructed
from (V ,YA, YE) to (V ′, Y ′′′A , Y
′′′
E ) for each V
′
, Y ′′′A , and Y
′′′
E . Repeat for all I
′ ⊆ LAB .
Delete any edge (n, I ′′, n′) such that there exists an edge (n, I ′, n′) and I ′′ ⊆ I ′. These are
the only edges out of (V ,YA, YE).
Let L0 be the set of initial clauses of T . Let C0 be the set of right hand sides of the
clauses in L0. For each valuation V which satisfies C0, where YA is the set of literals
occurring on the right hand sides of the A sometime clauses fired by V , i.e., for each
Q⇒A♦l ∈ T such that V |=Q, l ∈ YA and YE is the set of labelled literals l〈cj〉 such that
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Q⇒ E♦l〈cj〉 ∈ T and V |=Q. The node (V ,YA, YE) is designated as an initial node of H .
The labelled behaviour graph for a set of SNFB clauses T is the set of nodes and edges
reachable from the initial nodes by either EB or ET edges.
Lemma 24. The sets of nodes disallowed during the construction of Vp, namely
{Bp,B¬p,p} and {Bp,B¬p,¬p} are unsatisfiable.
Proof. Sets containing both Bp and B¬p are unsatisfiable due to the D axiom. Applying
the D axiom Bp⇒¬B¬p to Bp we can infer ¬B¬p which contradicts with B¬p. ✷
Definition 25. Given a set of labels I , an I labelled terminal subgraph (N ′,∅,E′T ) of a
graph (N,EB,ET ) is one such that
• N ′ ⊆N and E′T ⊆ET ; and• for any node n ∈ N ′ if for any edge (n, J,n′) ∈ ET and I ∩ J = ∅ then n′ ∈ N ′
and (n, J,n′) ∈ E′T and for all edges (n, J ′, n′′) ∈ ET such that I ∩ J ′ = ∅ then
(n, J ′, n′′) /∈E′T .
Definition 26. Given a graph (N,EB,ET ), a set of labels I and a node n ∈ N , a node
n′ ∈N is I reachable from n is one such that
• (n, J,n′) ∈ET is labelled by one or more elements of I , i.e., I ∩ J = ∅; or
• (n, J,n′′) ∈ ET is labelled by one or more elements of I , i.e., I ∩ J = ∅ and n′ is I
reachable from n′′; or
Lemma 27. Let S be a set of SNFB clauses such that Q ⇒ A♦l ∈ S and let H =
(N,EB,ET ) be the labelled behaviour graph for S. For any node n = (V ,YA, YE) ∈ H
if l ∈ YA and V |= l then V |=wl .
Proof. From the construction of the labelled behaviour graph an edge may only be drawn
from node n′ = (V ′, Y ′A, Y ′E) to a node n= (V ,YA, YE) such that l ∈ YA iff either V |=Q
or l ∈ Y ′A. The proof is by induction on the length of the shortest path to n from a node
n′′ = (V ′′, Y ′′A, Y ′′E) such that V ′′ |=Q.
The base case is where the length is zero, i.e., n= n′′ and therefore V |=Q and l ∈ YA
by construction. By augmentation true ⇒¬Q∨ l ∨wl ∈ S. By assumption V |= l, hence
V |=wl .
Otherwise assume the lemma holds for nodes n′ distance m from a node n′′ where
V ′′ |= Q and prove it holds for those n = (V ,YA, YE) distance m + 1. Thus l ∈ YA and
V |= l and V |=Q by assumption. From the inductive hypothesis we have V ′ |= wl . By
augmentation we have wl ⇒A (wl ∨ l) ∈ S. Thus by construction we have V |=wl . ✷
Lemma 28. Let S be a set of SNFB clauses such that Q ⇒ E♦l〈cj〉 ∈ S and H =
(N,EB,ET ) be the labelled behaviour graph for S. If for any node n= (V ,YA, YE) ∈H
such that l〈cj〉 ∈ YE and V |= l then V |=wl .
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Proof. Similar to the above but we use the fact that we have augmented with wl ⇒
E (wl ∨ l)〈cj〉 ∈ S. ✷
Lemma 29. Let S be a set of SNFB clauses and let T be the set of SNFB clauses obtained
from S by adding finitely many initial clauses or finitely many A-step clauses or finitely
many literal or belief clauses which only involve propositions occurring in S. Then the
labelled behaviour graph of T (H ′ = (N ′,E′B,E′T )) contains a subset of nodes and edgesfrom that for S (H = (N,EB,ET )), i.e., N ′ ⊆N , E′B ⊆EB , E′T ⊆ET .
Proof. This is established by induction on the length of the shortest path by following
modal or temporal edges from an initial node to another node in the labelled behaviour
graph of T . Let len be the length of the shortest path from an initial node to a node n. To
show the base case we let len = 0 and show that any initial node in the labelled behaviour
graph of T is an initial node in the labelled behaviour graph of S. Let I ⊆ S be the initial
clauses of S and I ′ ⊆ T the initial clauses of T . Let M ⊆ S be the literal or belief clauses
of S and M ′ ⊆ T be the literal or belief clauses of T . As T has been constructed by adding
initial or A-step clauses and/or literal or belief clauses to S, I ⊆ I ′ and M ⊆M ′. Take any
initial node n0 = (V0, YA0, YE0) in the labelled behaviour graph for T . From the definition
of the labelled behaviour graph V0 must satisfy the right hand side of the clauses in I ′ and
the right hand side of clauses in M ′. As I ⊆ I ′ and M ⊆M ′ then V0 must also satisfy the
right hand side of the clauses in both I and M . As the set of sometime clauses in S and
T are unchanged, i.e., as V0 satisfies the left hand side of the same sometime clauses in
S and T the sets YA0 and YE0 will be the same in each graph for V0 and thus the node
n0 = (V0, YA0, YE0) is also in the labelled behaviour graph for S.
Next we assume that if any node n, where the length of the shortest path from an initial
node to n is m, is in the labelled behaviour graph for T , it is also in the labelled behaviour
graph for S. We show that any node n′ in the labelled behaviour graph for T whose shortest
path length from an initial node is m+ 1, is also in the labelled behaviour graph for S. Let
J ⊆ S be the A-step clauses in S and J ′ ⊆ T the A-step clauses in T . As above let M ⊆ S
be the literal or belief clauses of S and M ′ ⊆ T be the literal or belief clauses of T . By
assumption we have J ⊆ J ′ and M ⊆M ′. Consider some node n′ = (V ′, Y ′A, Y ′E) in the
labelled behaviour graph of T where the shortest path from an initial node to n′ is m+ 1.
Let n= (V ,YA, YE) be any node in the labelled behaviour graph for T such that there is an
edge either in E′B or E′T from n to n′ and the shortest path from an initial node to n is of
length m. By the induction hypothesis, we assume that n is also in the labelled behaviour
graph for S.
First assume (n, I, n′) is in E′T . Let X′ ⊆ J ′ be the set of A-step clauses in T such that
the left hand sides are satisfied by V . By construction the right hand sides of the clauses
in X′ (without the A operators) are satisfied by V ′. Let X ⊆ J be the corresponding
set of A-step clauses in S, i.e., where the left hand sides are satisfied by V and thus by
construction the right hand sides (without the A operators) are satisfied by V ′. As J ⊆ J ′
we have X ⊆X′ and as previously we have M ⊆M ′ so V ′ must also satisfy the right hand
sides of the clauses in X and M . Furthermore as no change has been made to the set of
sometime clauses any eventualities outstanding from n or triggered by n′ will be the same
in each graph. Thus n′ is also present in the labelled behaviour graph for S.
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Next assume (n,n′) is in E′B . Thus both V and V ′ must satisfy M ′ by definition and for
all Bl ∈ V , V ′ |= l, and Bl ∈ V iff Bl ∈ V ′, and ¬Bl ∈ V iff ¬Bl ∈ V ′. We have M ⊆M ′
so V ′ satisfies M . Other criteria are unchanged so V ′ is also in H . ✷
Lemma 30. Let S be a set of SNFB clauses and let T be the set of SNFB clauses
obtained from S by adding an E-step clause from performing a step resolution inference
(SRES2, SRES3, SRES4) or from applying TRES2 or TRES4. Then the labelled behaviour
graph of T (H ′ = (N ′,E′B,E′T )) contains a subset of nodes and edges from that for S
(H = (N,EB,ET )), i.e., N ′ ⊆N , E′B ⊆EB , E′T ⊆ ET .
Proof. Assume P ⇒ E (F ∨ l)〈cj〉 and Q⇒ A (G ∨ ¬l) are both in S and T and
that T = S ∪ {(P ∧Q)⇒ E (F ∨G)〈cj〉}, i.e., following an application of SRES2. That
is, the set T is the same as S apart from adding the above resolvent. Take any node
n = (V ,YA, YE) in the labelled behaviour graph for T such that V satisfies both P and
Q. Let n′ = (V ′, Y ′A, Y ′E) where (n, I, n′) and 〈cj〉 ∈ I . From the construction of the graph
V ′ satisfies (F ∨ l), (G∨¬l) and (F ∨G). As V ′ satisfies (F ∨ l) and (G∨¬l) then n′ is
also in S where 〈cj〉 ∈ I for (n, I, n′). The argument is similar when applying SRES3 and
SRES4.
Finally take the addition of wl ⇒ E (l ∨ ¬Fi)〈cj〉 to S to form T after temporal
resolution between a sometime clause labelled by 〈cj〉 and a loop formula ∨i Fi . From
augmentation S (and therefore T ) must contain wl ⇒ E (l ∨ wl)〈cj〉. Take a node
n = (V ,YA, YE) in T such that V satisfies wl . Let n′ = (V ′, Y ′A, Y ′E) be a node in the
labelled behaviour graph for T such that (n, I, n′) ∈E′T and 〈cj〉 ∈ I . Thus by construction
V ′ satisfies (l ∨¬Fi) and (l ∨wl) so V ′ is also in the labelled behaviour graph for S. ✷
Definition 31 (Reduced labelled behaviour graph). Given a labelled behaviour graph for
a set of clauses T carry out the following deletions. Delete any node n= (V ,YA, YE) and
any edges into or out of n as follows.
(1) If a node has no temporal edges leading from it delete this node and all edges into it.
(2) If RE{〈ci 〉} , for some node and label 〈ci〉, is non-empty, where RE{〈ci 〉} is the largest set
of E step clauses of T labelled by 〈ci〉 such that V satisfies the left hand side of each
clause in RE{〈ci 〉} , and no temporal edges leading from this node are labelled by 〈ci〉
delete this node and all edges into it.
(3) If a node (V ,YA, YE) contains an eventuality l ∈ YA and l is neither satisfied by V nor
is there a node reachable from (V ,YA, YE) by following temporal (ET ) edges only,
whose valuation satisfies l then (V ,YA, YE) is deleted.
(4) If a node (V ,YA, YE) contains an eventuality l ∈ YA and l is neither satisfied by V nor
is there a node I reachable from (V ,YA, YE), for I some non-empty subset of labels
occurring in T , whose valuation satisfies l then (V ,YA, YE) is deleted.
(5) If a node (V ,YA, YE) contains a labelled eventuality l〈cj〉 ∈ YE and l is neither satisfied
by V nor is there a node reachable from (V ,YA, YE) whose valuation satisfies l by
following temporal (ET ) edges only then (V ,YA, YE) is deleted.
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(6) If a node (V ,YA, YE) contains a labelled eventuality l〈cj〉 ∈ YE and l is neither satisfied
by V nor is there a node {〈cj〉} reachable from (V ,YA, YE) whose valuation satisfies l
then (V ,YA, YE) is deleted.
The resulting graph is known as the reduced labelled behaviour graph for T .
Lemma 32. Let T be a set of SNFB clauses and H = (N,EB,ET ) be the reduced labelled
behaviour graph for T . If ¬Bl ∈ V for some node n = (V ,YA, YE) ∈ N then there is a
node n′ = (V ′, Y ′A, Y ′E) ∈N such that V |= ¬l where (n,n′) ∈EB .
Proof. Assume H contains a node n= (V ,YA, YE) ∈N that contains a formula ¬Bl, i.e.,
¬Bl ∈ V and there is no node n′ = (V ′, Y ′A, Y ′E) such that (n,n′) ∈EB and ¬l ∈ V ′. Note
that V cannot contain Bl as it contains ¬Bl and nodes containing Bl and ¬Bl are not
permitted as they are unsatisfiable. By construction of the graph each node must satisfy
each belief clause in the clause set, plus each clause with the external B pushed into it.
Assume first that the literals and modal literals in V without l, i.e., V \{l}, satisfy the set
of belief clauses with the B-operator pushed into each clause. Hence there must be a node
n′ = (V ′, Y ′A, Y ′E) such that V ′ is the same as V except it contains ¬l rather than l. As V ′
contains the same modal literals as V there must be an edge from n to n′. Hence ¬Bl can
be satisfied in a node n′ where (n,n′) ∈EB and our original assumption was wrong. Next
we assume that l must be in V to satisfy a clause in T . We consider three cases.
• Assume that l is in V as T contains the clause true ⇒ l. To satisfy this clause every
node in H contains l. By pushing in the external B the set of clauses including the
pushed clauses must contain the clause true⇒ Bl so each node in H must also contain
Bl. No node can contain both Bl and ¬Bl hence l cannot be in V because of a clause
true⇒ l.
• Assume that l is in V from satisfying a clause true⇒D ∨ l where D is a disjunction
of modal literals and where V does not satisfy D. By pushing in the external B
operator we obtain the clause true ⇒ D ∨ Bl hence n must also contain Bl. As no
node can contain both Bl and ¬Bl the node n cannot exist because of satisfying l in
a clause true ⇒D ∨ l. Note if V satisfied D the case is as described above—a node
n′ = (V ′, Y ′A, Y ′E) must exist such that V ′ is the same as V except it contains ¬l rather
than l and hence ¬Bl is satisfiable.
• Assume that l is in V from satisfying a clause true⇒D ∨ l where D is a disjunction
of literals or modal literals and where n does not satisfy D. We let D = L∨M where
L is a disjunction of literals and M is a disjunction of modal literals. As V does
not satisfy D, V must satisfy ¬D therefore V satisfies ¬L and ¬M . Now for any
node n′ = (V ′, Y ′A, Y ′E) such that (n,n′) ∈ EB , ¬Bl ∈ V ′ and V ′ must satisfy ¬M
by construction of the graph (as M is a disjunction of modal literals). However if V ′
satisfies L (and therefore D) and ¬l then the clause true⇒D ∨ l is satisfied. Further
¬Bl is satisfied as required. The only situation when this does not occur is when
(¬Bl ∧¬M)⇒¬L, i.e., to satisfy the clause, true⇒ L∨M ∨ l, l must hold in each
node when both ¬M and ¬Bl do. Consider any node n′ such that (n,n′) ∈ EB . The
node n′ must satisfy both ¬Bl and ¬M , by construction of the graph, and therefore
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must also contain l. Hence there is no node n′ such that (n,n′) ∈ EB containing
¬l. However having pushed the B-operator into the clauses each node must satisfy
true ⇒ Bl ∨M ∨ ¬BL. Here no node n′ such that (n,n′) ∈ EB contains L so ¬BL
is unsatisfiable, M is unsatisfiable by assumption, so n must contain Bl. However we
have assumed n contains ¬Bl so n does not satisfy the set of pushed clauses and must
be deleted. ✷
Lemma 33. If H = (N,EB,ET ) is a reduced labelled behaviour graph for a set of clauses
then the set of edges EB form a relation which is transitive, serial and Euclidean.
Proof. To show the EB relation is transitive in the unreduced graph take any nodes
n = (V ,YA, YE) ∈ N and n′ = (V ′, Y ′A, Y ′E) ∈ N and n′′ = (V ′′, Y ′′A, Y ′′E) ∈ N where
(n,n′) ∈ EB and (n′, n′′) ∈ EB . We must show that (n,n′′) ∈ EB . From the conditions
of adding modal edges we must show that
(1) if Bl ∈ V then V ′′ |= l (i.e., V ′′ |= B_set (V )); and
(2) Bl ∈ V ′′ ⇔ Bl ∈ V and ¬Bl ∈ V ′′ ⇔ ¬Bl ∈ V for each literal l.
From condition (2) of adding edges between nodes we know that the set of modal literals
in V and V ′ are the same and the set of modal literals in V ′ and V ′′ are the same. Hence
the set of modal literals in V and V ′′ are the same thus satisfying the second condition.
As the set of modal literals in V and V ′ are the same then B_set (V ) = B_set (V ′).
From condition (1) applied to node n′, V ′′ |= B_set (V ′) thus V ′′ |= B_set (V ) and the
first condition is also fullfilled. To obtain the reduced labelled behaviour graph nodes are
deleted from the unreduced labelled behaviour graph. If a node is deleted from a relation
that is transitive then the relation is still transitive so the EB relation is transitive in the
reduced labelled behaviour graph.
To show Euclideaness take any nodes n= (V ,YA, YE) ∈ N and n′ = (V ′, Y ′A, Y ′E) ∈ N
and n′′ = (V ′′, Y ′′A, Y ′′E) ∈ N where (n,n′) ∈ EB and (n,n′′) ∈ EB . We must show that
(n′, n′′) ∈EB . From the conditions of adding modal edges we must show that
(1) if Bl ∈ V ′ then V ′′ |= l (i.e., V ′′ |= B_set (V ′)); and
(2) Bl ∈ V ′′ ⇔ Bl ∈ V ′ and ¬Bl ∈ V ′′ ⇔ ¬Bl ∈ V ′ for each literal l.
From condition (2) of adding edges between nodes we know that the set of modal literals
in V and V ′ are the same and the set of modal literals in V and V ′′ are the same, hence
the set of modal literals in V ′′ and V ′ are the same. Thus the second condition follows.
As the set of modal literals in V , V ′ and V ′′ are the same then B_set (V )= B_set (V ′)=
B_set (V ′′). From the construction of the graph and as (n,n′′) ∈ EB by assumption then
V ′′ |= B_set (V ). Thus V ′′ |= B_set (V ′) and the first condition is also fullfilled. The
deletion of nodes to obtain the reduced labelled behaviour graph doesn’t affect the property
of Euclideaness so the EB relation is Euclidean in the reduced labelled behaviour graph.
To show seriality we know every node in the reduced labelled behaviour graph contains
a modal formula of the form ¬Bl. From Lemma 32 any node containing ¬Bl has an edge
to a node containing ¬l, hence the relation is serial.
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Hence the sets of nodes reachable via the relations in EB are transitive, Euclidean and
serial and can be used to construct the R relation. ✷
Proposition 34. A set of clauses T in SNFB is unsatisfiable if and only if its reduced
labelled behaviour graph is empty.
Proof. We start by showing the ‘if’ part. The construction of nodes in the labelled
behaviour graph generate all possible states the system may be in and any nodes reachable
from the initial nodes in the reduced labelled behaviour graph can be used to construct a
model for T by unwinding through the temporal edges to construct trees and using modal
edges to reconstruct the transitive, Euclidean, serial relations.
We begin by justifying our choice of sets of literals and modal literals for each
proposition p ∈ T for each node (V ,YA, YE). From Lemma 24 any nodes disallowed
during the construction of Vp for each p are unsatisfiable so could not form part of a
model. Further, each node must satisfy the clause on the right hand side of each belief
clause so the deletion of nodes that do not satisfy the belief clauses does not remove any
models. Finally to take account of the external B operator we push B into each clause and
ensure that each node satisfies this set of clauses.
Secondly, infinite trees can be constructed by starting from an initial node n =
(V ,YA, YE), adding to the tree a node n′ for each different label occurring on edges
(n, I, n′) ∈ ET and zero or more other nodes. If all edges (n, I, n′) ∈ ET are unlabelled,
i.e., I = ∅ at least one unlabelled edge must be added. An infinite tree of propositional
valuations is obtained by extracting the literals from each V . By construction of the graph,
this sequence satisfies the conditions for constructing trees for T apart from the conditions
concerning the satisfaction of eventualities (and none infinite paths). The reconstruction
of the (belief ) R relation from the reduced labelled behaviour graph, H , will construct
transitive, Euclidean, serial relations from the construction of the EB edges in H .
If the unreduced labelled behaviour graph is empty then there are no nodes that directly
satisfy the set of clauses T , i.e., without considering the satisfaction of eventualities (or
none infinite paths). There must be no reachable nodes from the set of initial nodes and
as we have tried to construct every possible state for the set of clauses T then T must be
unsatisfiable.
If the unreduced labelled behaviour graph is not empty however not all sets of nodes
reachable from the initial nodes can be used to construct models of T . If a node n has no
temporal successors then there are no infinite paths through that node. So any models of
T must arise from a path through the graph with n deleted. Hence we can apply deletion
criterion one without removing any models. If the left hand side of a node n satisfies one
or more E step clauses labelled by 〈cj〉 and no edge out of n is labelled by 〈cj〉 then we
cannot satisfy the right hand side of the E step clauses so any model of T must arise from a
path through the graph with n deleted. Hence we can apply deletion criterion two without
removing any models.
Also if n contains an A eventuality l then any path through that node which is to yield a
model of T must satisfy l either at n or somewhere later in the path, i.e., by unwinding
through the temporal edges. Hence we can apply the third deletion criterion without
discarding any potential models. Similarly, if n contains an A eventuality l then any path
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labelled by a subset of labels through that node which is to yield a model of T must satisfy
l either at n or somewhere later in the path, i.e., by unwinding through particular labelled
temporal edges. Hence we can apply the fourth deletion criterion without discarding any
potential models. If n= (V ,YA, YE) contains an E eventuality l, i.e., l〈cj〉 ∈ YE then l must
be satisfied on an {〈cj〉} reachable path. Hence if l is not satisfied on any path we can
apply the fifth deletion criterion. Finally, given a node n = (V ,YA, YE) which contains
eventuality l labelled by 〈cj〉, i.e., l〈cj〉 ∈ YE any path through that node producing a model
of T must satisfy l either at n or later at an {〈cj〉} reachable node. Hence we can apply the
final deletion condition. The “if” part follows.
We now show the ‘only if’ part. Assume that the reduced labelled behaviour graph is
non-empty. We know the set of initial nodes is non-empty because the reduced labelled
behaviour graph is defined to be the set of nodes reachable from the initial nodes. We will
construct a model of T . For any node n added to the construction, we will unwind through
the temporal edges to construct trees that satisfy the set of step clauses, making sure all the
eventualities triggered from satisfying the left hand side of sometime rules are satisfied.
Secondly we add modal successors to any nodes constructed.
For the modal dimension we must show that for any Bl ∈ n in the reduced labelled
behaviour graph all nodes n′ = (V ′, Y ′A, Y ′E) such that (n,n′) ∈ EB satisfy V ′ |= l and for
each ¬Bl ∈ n there exists some n′ = (V ′, Y ′A, Y ′E) such that (n,n′) ∈ EB and V ′ |= ¬l
where EB is transitive, Euclidean and serial. We ensure that for any modal literal Bl ∈ n, l
is satisfied in all nodes (n,n′) ∈EB by construction of the belief edges EB . Further recall
that the set of belief clauses in T have an external B and every node must lead to one that
satisfies these clauses. This is achieved by deleting nodes that do not immediately satisfy
these clauses during the construction of the labelled behaviour graph. Finally we must
check that from each node containing ¬Bl there is an edge in EB to a node containing ¬l.
This is shown in Lemma 32. Next we check the EB relation is transitive, Euclidean and
serial. This is shown in Lemma 33.
Next we show how to construct a model from the non-empty reduced labelled behaviour
graph. First we construct timelines by unwinding through the temporal dimension making
sure each E step clause is satisfied and each eventuality is satisfied. Let node be a function
from points to N which relates every point added to the construction to the node in
the reduced labelled behaviour graph it was constructed from. Let lits be a function
defined as lits (n) = {l | l is a literal and l ∈ n} where n ∈ N . We unwind through the
temporal dimension starting at an initial node n0 = (V0, YA, YE). Let (t,0)= lits (n0) and
node (t,0)= n0. For each labelled literal l〈ci〉 ∈ YE construct a new timeline t and unwind
through an {〈ci〉} reachable path n0, n1, . . . , setting (t, i)= lits (ni) and node (t, i)= ni ,
until we reach a point (t, j) such that node (t, j) = nj where l is satisfied. This must be
possible because if each l〈ci〉 was not able to be satisfied in a reachable node then the node
must have been deleted by the fifth or sixth deletion criterion. From (t, j) construct a path
that satisfies each A eventuality in the initial node in turn ignoring any eventualities that
have been satisfied on the way. This must be possible because if each eventuality was
not able to be satisfied in a reachable node then the node must have been deleted by the
third and fourth deletion criterion. For each point (t, k)= lits (nk) added to timeline t from
unwinding through a node nk in the reduced labelled behaviour graph we add node (t, k)=
nk to the function node. Repeat the process for each l〈ci〉 ∈ YE in node n0. Finally let I be
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the set of labels of edges leading from n0. For each label 〈ci〉 ∈ I such that there is no
labelled literal k〈ci〉 ∈ YE construct a new timeline t ′ such that node (t ′,0)= n0 and unwind
through an 〈ci〉 labelled edge to node n′1 where (n, I ′, n′1) ∈ ET where 〈ci〉 ∈ I ′, setting
node (t ′,1)= n′1 and (t ′,1)= lits (n′1). There must be such a node due to deletion criterion
two. Note timelines t and t ′ coincide up to point (t,0). Then from n′1 select a path that
satisfies each A eventuality in the initial node in turn ignoring any eventualities that have
been satisfied by nodes n and n′1. This must be possible because if each eventuality was
not able to be satisfied in a reachable node then the node must have been deleted by the
third and fourth deletion criterion. Repeat with each point, (t, u) where node (t, u) = nu
added to the construction, i.e., extend nu to some nv where (nu, I, nv) ∈ ET for every
label leading from nu and make sure all outstanding eventualities are satisfied (without
adding paths to satisfy eventualities already satisfied), until we have a finite tree where all
eventualities in the initial node have been satisfied in every leaf.
Once all the eventualities from the initial node have been satisfied at each leaf node,
let n1 be some leaf node. The tree through n1 is extended constructing a branch to satisfy
each E eventuality and satisfying every A eventuality in n1 as above. Again take a leaf
node at this point and call it n2. This construction continues until we reach a successor
node ni = nj for some i > j that we have reached before. This must eventually happen
as the graph is finite. Let Q be the path (obtained from the unwinding above) between ni
and nj . Then the path obtained from unwinding up to the node ni followed by an infinite
cycle of the path Q has the property that for each node in the path each A eventuality is
satisfied by some node later in the path and each E eventuality is satisfied on some path.
Recall from the construction of the graph if an A eventuality e has not been satisfied in a
node then it must be contained in the set of eventualities in any successor nodes. Hence
if any eventuality e has not been satisfied by the time we reach some nB it either must
be satisfied in nB or must appear in the set of eventualities in nB and be satisfied in the
next portion of path. For each point (t, u) such that node (t, u)= nu constructed in the tree
add modal edges to any point (t, u′) already constructed such that node (t, u′) = nu′ and
(nu,nu′) ∈ EB . If there is no such point construct one and construct timelines from this
point and modal edges as above.
Thus we can construct infinite trees of states where all eventualities are satisfied through
the temporal edges and the modal edges form transitive, Euclidean, serial relations so the
construction of timelines and reconstruction of the agent accessibility relation means that
from the construction of a non-empty labelled behaviour graph we can construct a model
for T , i.e., T is satisfiable. ✷
In the graph we have pushed the B operator into clauses to construct the graph, whereas
in the resolution system we work on unpushed clauses. The next lemma shows that any
resolution step we can do with the pushed clauses we can do with the unpushed clauses
to obtain the same or a stronger resolvent. To prove the next theorem we require an
additional resolution rule MRES4c. Later we show that this additional rule is unnecessary
for completeness. Hence its omission from the presentation of resolution rules in Section 5.
[MRES4c]
true ⇒ D ∨B¬l1
true ⇒ D′ ∨ l1 ∨ l2
true ⇒ D ∨mod (D′)∨Bl2
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Lemma 35. Let R be a literal or belief clause and let XR be the set of belief clauses having
distributed the B operator over R. For any belief or literal clause R1 that can be resolved
with a member of XR to give R2 we can resolve R with R1 to give R3 where R3 ⇒ R2
using MRES1, MRES2, MRES4a, MRES4b or MRES4c.
Proof. First consider the literal clause R whose right hand side contains a single literal,
i.e., true ⇒ l. Pushing B into this clause we obtain true ⇒ Bl. This can be resolved
with the clauses true ⇒ ¬l ∨ D, true ⇒ B¬l ∨ D or true ⇒ ¬Bl ∨ D obtaining the
resolvent true ⇒ mod (D) by applying MRES4b and true ⇒ D by applying MRES2
or MRES1 respectively. The clause true ⇒ l can also be resolved with the same three
clauses and produce true⇒D by applying MRES1, MRES4b and MRES4a respectively.
As (true⇒D)⇒ (true⇒ mod (D)) we are done.
Next we examine belief clauses containing a single literal, for example true ⇒ l ∨D′
where D′ is a disjunction of modal literals. Pushing B into this clause and obtaining
true ⇒ Bl ∨ D′ we may resolve it with true ⇒ ¬l ∨ D, true ⇒ B¬l ∨ D or true ⇒
¬Bl ∨D where D is a disjunction of literals or modal literals by applying rules MRES4b,
MRES2 or MRES1 and obtaining the resolvent true ⇒ mod (D) ∨D′ by resolving with
MRES4b and true ⇒D ∨D′ by resolving with MRES2 or MRES1. The original clause
true ⇒ l ∨ D′ may also be resolved with each of the clauses using the resolution rules
MRES1, MRES4b, MRES4a respectively to produce true ⇒ D ∨ D′ (recall from the
definition of mod that as D′ is a disjunction of modal literals D′ = mod (D′)). Again this
implies the previous resolvents.
Finally we consider the case where there is more than one literal in a belief clause.
Without loss of generality we consider a clause with two literals true⇒ l1 ∨ l2 ∨D′ where
D′ is a disjunction of modal literals (or false). Pushing in a B operator we obtain two
clauses true ⇒ Bl1 ∨ ¬B¬l2 ∨ D′ and true ⇒ ¬B¬l1 ∨ Bl2 ∨ D′. Now at least one
of these clauses can be resolved with the clauses true ⇒¬li ∨D, true ⇒ B¬li ∨D or
true ⇒ ¬Bli ∨ D for i = 1,2 where D is a disjunction of literals or modal literals by
applying rules MRES4b, MRES4a, MRES2 or MRES1. We consider the resolvents for
resolving with true ⇒ Bl1 ∨ ¬B¬l2 ∨D′; the other case is similar. This clause may be
resolved with true⇒¬l1∨D, true⇒ B¬l1∨D, true⇒¬Bl1∨D or true⇒ B¬l2∨D.
The resolvents obtained are true ⇒ mod (D) ∨ ¬B¬l2 ∨D′, true ⇒ D ∨ ¬B¬l2 ∨D′,
true ⇒ D ∨ ¬B¬l2 ∨ D′ and true ⇒ Bl1 ∨ D ∨ D′ respectively. These resolvents,
or resolvents that imply these resolvents can be generated from resolving the original
clause with each of these clauses to obtain true ⇒ D ∨ l2 ∨D′, true ⇒ D ∨ Bl2 ∨D′,
true ⇒ D ∨ ¬B¬l2 ∨D′ and true ⇒ Bl1 ∨D ∨D′ using the resolution rules MRES1,
MRES4c, MRES4a and MRES4c respectively. ✷
Lemma 36. If a set of belief clauses is unsatisfiable then there is a refutation using
resolution rules IRES1, IRES2, MRES1, MRES2, MRES4a, MRES4b or MRES4c.
Proof. Assume that T ′ is the set of clauses T plus the result of pushing the external B-
operator into any belief clause. Then the set of clauses T ′ is unsatisfiable using classical
resolution between literals or modal literals and their negations, modal resolution between
modal literalsBl andB¬l. That is, by applying the resolution rules IRES1, IRES2, MRES1
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(that resolves a formula and its negation) or MRES2 we can detect a contradiction. By
conjoining the set of belief clauses and rewriting the right hand side in DNF we obtain
true⇒
∨
i
Di
where
∨
i Di must be unsatisfiable, i.e.,
∨
i Di ⇒ false. If Di contains a literal or modal
literal and its negation or B¬l and Bl by applying resolution using rules MRES1 or
MRES2 we can add new clauses and exclude this disjunct. Otherwise each Di must cause a
contradiction with the right hand sides of the initial clauses and must be excluded. Thus we
can use the resolution rules IRES1, IRES2, MRES1 and MRES2 to derive a contradiction.
However in the resolution system the external B-operator is not pushed into the clauses
so we must make sure that any resolvents generated after B has been pushed into each
belief clause can be produced by applying MRES1, MRES2, MRES4a, MRES4b or
MRES4c. This is shown in Lemma 35. ✷
Lemma 37. If the unreduced labelled behaviour graph for a set of SNFB clauses T is
empty then a contradiction can be obtained by applying resolution rules IRES1, IRES2,
MRES1, MRES2, MRES4a, MRES4b or MRES4c to clauses in or derived from T .
Proof. If the labelled behaviour graph is empty then by Proposition 34 the set of clauses
T is unsatisfiable. Thus by Lemma 36 there is a refuatation using rules IRES1, IRES2,
MRES1, MRES2, MRES4a, MRES4b or MRES4c. ✷
Lemma 38. Let M be a satisfiable set of belief clauses such that Mj ∈M . We can derive
true⇒∨i li by applying modal resolution, if (∧j Mj )⇒ (true ⇒∨i li) such that there
is no disjunction of literals Y where (∧j Mj )⇒ (true⇒ Y ) and Y ⇒∨i li .
Proof. If (
∧
j Mj ) ⇒ (true ⇒
∨
i li ) then any model satisfying M must also satisfy
true ⇒∨i li , i.e., every state satisfies ∨i li . In particular the initial nodes must satisfy∨
i li hence M ∪ {start ⇒¬
∨
i li} is unsatisfiable. By completeness of modal resolution,
Lemma 36, from M ∪ {start ⇒ ¬∨i li} we can derive start ⇒ false. Apply modal
resolution rules to clauses in M to obtain M ′ until no new formulae are obtained. By
the soundness of modal resolution M ′ is satisfiable. Now from above the addition of
clauses start ⇒ ¬∨i li we can obtain a contradiction. Let the last resolution step to
obtain start ⇒ false be between start ⇒¬l0 and start ⇒ l0. Similarly let the previous
step be between start ⇒¬l1 and start ⇒ l0 ∨ l1 etc. until all the start ⇒¬li clauses
have been resolved. Note we may only resolve initial clauses with initial clauses or literal
clauses, so when we resolve with the first of the added initial clauses, i.e., start ⇒¬ln
we must resolve it with true⇒∨i li . We need to resolve with each start ⇒¬li to obtain
a contradiction otherwise if we can obtain a contradiction from the clauses start ⇒¬li
for 0  i  n − 1 without using start ⇒ ¬ln then (∧j Mi)⇒ (true ⇒ ∨n−1i=0 li) and∨n−1
i=0 li ⇒
∨n
i=0 li which is not allowed. ✷
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Theorem 39 (Completeness). If T a set of clauses in SNFB is unsatisfiable then it has a
refutation by the procedure described above using resolution rules IRES1, IRES2, MRES1,
MRES2, MRES4a, MRES4b, MRES4c, SRES1–5, and TRES1–4.
Let T be an unsatisfiable set of SNFB clauses. The proof proceeds by induction on
the number of nodes in the labelled behaviour graph of T . If the (unreduced) labelled
behaviour graph is empty then by by Lemma 37 we can obtain a contradiction by applying
resolution rules IRES1, IRES2, MRES1, MRES2, MRES4a, MRES4b or MRES4c.
Now suppose the labelled behaviour graph H is non-empty. By Proposition 34 the
reduced labelled behaviour graph must be empty so there must be a node than can be
deleted from H as described above.
If a terminal node (V ,YA, YE) exists, consider W , the union of the set of A step
clauses whose left hand side satisfy the valuation V . Let J be the set of literal and belief
clauses. Then, the right hand side of the clauses in W (having deleted the A and next
operators from the A step clauses), L, union with any right hand sides of literal clauses,
L′, such that
∨
j lj ∈ L′ iff J ⇒ (true⇒
∨
j lj ) and there is no Y where Y ⇒
∨
j lj and
J ⇒ (true⇒ Y ) form an unsatisfiable set of propositional clauses. Either true⇒∨j lj is
present in J or apply modal resolution to clauses in J until true ⇒∨j lj is derived. The
latter is possible due to Lemma 38. In both cases by completeness of classical resolution
again, there is a refutation of L ∪ L′. Choosing an element of W or L′ corresponding to
each element of L∪L′, we can “mimic” this classical refutation by step resolution (SRES1
and SRES4) inferences to derive an A step clause
l1 ∧ · · · ∧ lk ⇒A false (17)
where each li is a literal which is satisfied by V . Using SRES5 the temporal resolution
procedure allows us to rewrite clause (17) as
true ⇒ (¬l1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬lk). (18)
By Lemma 29, adding clause (18) (and any other resolvents derived along the way) to T
produces a clause set T ′ as every node must satisfy
i=k∨
i=1
¬li ,
(V ,YA, YE) is deleted and the graph for T ′ is a strict subset of the graph for T . By induction
we assume that T ′ has a refutation and so must T .
If a node n = (V ,YA, YE) exists where for some E step clause, X⇒ E Y〈cj〉, where
V |=X but no edge (n, I, n′) leading from n exists such that 〈cj〉 ∈ I then this node cannot
be in any model and should be deleted. For each node (V ,YA, YE), and label 〈cj〉, let RE{〈cj 〉}
be the set of E step clauses of T , labelled by label 〈cj〉, which are “fired” by V—that is,
the set of E step clauses labelled by 〈cj〉 whose left hand sides are satisfied by V . If RE{〈cj 〉}
is none-empty for some n= (V ,YA, YE) and there are no edges out of n labelled by 〈cj〉,
then this node cannot be in any model and should be deleted. This is because the clauses
from the right hand side of the clauses in RE
{〈cj 〉}
should be satisfied but cannot be. Thus by
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the completeness of classical resolution, assuming we have carried out all modal resolution
there must be a series of step resolution inferences (between elements of RE{〈cj 〉} , A step
clauses or literal clauses) that lead to
l1 ∧ · · · ∧ lk ⇒ E false〈cj〉
where V |= l1 ∧ · · · ∧ lk . This is rewritten as
true⇒ (¬l1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬lk). (19)
By Lemmas 29 and 30, by adding (19) and any other resolvents derived on the way to T to
produce a clause set T ′, the labelled behaviour graph is redrawn and as (V ,YA, YE) does
not satisfy
i=k∨
i=1
¬li
it is deleted and the graph for T ′ is a strict subset of the graph for T . By induction we
assume that T ′ has a refutation and so must T .
Otherwise, if no terminal node exists there must be a node n that contains an eventuality
l, where l is not satisfied in a terminal subgraph of nodes reachable from n following
temporal edges. We have four cases to correspond with the four resolution rules.
• A♦l and A loop If N ′ is the set of nodes reachable from n via ET edges then any
edges in ET out of a node in N ′ lead to a node that is also in N ′ where for each n′ ∈N ′
we have n′ |= ¬l. For each node n= (V ,YA, YE) in N ′ the set of step clauses or literal
clauses whose left hand side is satisfied by V are combined to give Fn ⇒A Gn for
n ∈N ′. To show this is a loop in ¬l we must check two conditions.
– For each n ∈ N ′ we must have |= Gn ⇒¬l. Let V be a set of literals and modal
literals from a node in H that satisfies Gn. By the construction of the labelled
behaviour graph there is a temporal successor of n in H of the form (V ′, Y ′A, Y ′E).
By assumption this node is also in N ′ and therefore V ′ |= l so for all n ∈N ′, Gn ∧ l
is unsatisfiable and therefore |=Gn⇒¬l.
– For each n ∈ N ′ we must have |=Gn ⇒∨n′∈N ′ Fn′ . Let V be a set of literals and
modal literals from a node in H that satisfies Gn. By the construction of H since
V |= Gn there is an edge from n to a node n′ ∈ N ′ whose valuation is V ′. Since
n′ ∈N ′, by assumption we have V ′ |= Fn′ . Hence |=Gn⇒∨n′∈N ′ Fn′ as required.
We can use the set of clauses Fn ⇒ A Gn for resolution with each eventuality l
occurring in T . Consider any node n = (V ,YA, YE) ∈ N ′ where l ∈ YA, i.e., l is an
unsatisfied A-eventuality. Let L be defined as
L=
∨
n∈N ′
Fn.
Note that V |= L, V |= l and V |=wl (by Lemma 27). Through augmentation we have
added the clauses
wl ⇒A (l ∨wl)
true⇒ (¬Q∨ l ∨wl)
84 C. Dixon et al. / Artificial Intelligence 139 (2002) 47–89
for some Q⇒A♦l ∈ T . Either there is an edge e ∈ET from some node (V ′, Y ′A, Y ′E)
into n such that l ∈ Y ′A and V ′ |= l or T contains a clause Q⇒A♦l where V |=Q and
V |= l. For the former we must have V ′ |= wl by Lemma 27. Applying the temporal
resolution rule adds the resolvent wl ⇒ A (l ∨ ¬L) to the set of step clauses in T .
Now V ′ satisfies the left hand side of this clause, i.e., V ′ |=wl but V does not satisfy
the disjunction on the right hand side (l∨¬L) so the resulting labelled behaviour graph
does not contain e. Otherwise for the latter we have Q⇒ A♦l, V |=Q and V |= l.
Then resolving the eventuality clause with the loop we obtain true ⇒¬Q ∨ l ∨ ¬L
as one of the resolvents. Now n doesn’t satisfy this resolvent and so n must be deleted
from H . In either case n either becomes unreachable or is deleted. So, the labelled
behaviour graph for T ′ is a strict subset of that for T and by induction we assume that
as T ′ has a refutation so must T .
• A♦l and E loop Similar to above but we consider terminal subgraphs that cannot be
exited by some set of labelled edges.
• E♦l and A loop Similar to above but we consider nodes containing the E eventuality
l and there is no path to a node which satisfies l.
• E♦l and E loop Similar to above but we consider nodes containing the E eventuality
l labelled by 〈cj〉 and there is no {〈cj〉} reachable path to a node which satisfies l.
Finally we show that the extra modal resolution rule we introduced is not necessary for
completeness.
Lemma 40. Let P1 and P2 be two belief clauses which can be resolved using MRES4c to
give R1. Then for any belief clause P3 that can be resolved with R1 to obtain R2, we can
resolve P3 with P2 and then P1 to obtain R3 where R3 ⇒R1 using only MRES1, MRES2,
MRES4a, or MRES4b.
Proof. Let P1, P2 and R1 be as follows and apply MRES4c.
P1 true ⇒ D ∨B¬l1
P2 true ⇒ D′ ∨ l1 ∨ l2
R1 true ⇒ D ∨mod (D′)∨Bl2
We can resolve the modal literal Bl2 in resolvent R1 with the following:
P3 true ⇒ D′′ ∨ ¬l2
P ′3 true ⇒ D′′ ∨ ¬Bl2
P ′′3 true ⇒ D′′ ∨B¬l2
to obtain
R2 true ⇒ D ∨mod (D′)∨mod (D′′) [R1,P3,MRES4c]
R′2 true ⇒ D ∨mod (D′)∨D′′ [R1,P ′3,MRES1]
R′′2 true ⇒ D ∨mod (D′)∨D′′ [R1,P ′′3 ,MRES2]
Next we resolve each of P3, P ′3 or P ′′3 with one of the original parents P2
R3 true ⇒ D′ ∨ l1 ∨D′′ [P2,P3,MRES1]
R′3 true ⇒ mod (D′)∨¬B¬l1 ∨D′′ [P2,P ′3,MRES4a]
R′′3 true ⇒ mod (D′)∨¬B¬l1 ∨D′′ [P2,P ′′3 ,MRES4b]
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and then each of these with P1
R4 true ⇒ D ∨mod (D′)∨mod (D′′) [P1,R3,MRES4b]
R′4 true ⇒ D ∨mod (D′)∨D′′ [P1,R′3,MRES1]
R′′4 true ⇒ D ∨mod (D′)∨D′′ [P1,R′′3 ,MRES1]
In each case we have R4 ⇒R2, R′4 ⇒R′2, R′′4 ⇒R′′2 . ✷
Corollary 41. If a formula, ϕ, in BBn is unsatisfiable it has a refutation using the procedure
given in Section 5.
Proof. ϕ is unsatisfiable, therefore, by Theorem 15, τ0(ϕ) its translation into SNFB is
unsatisfiable. By Theorem 39 we can derive a contradiction using the resolution rules in
Section 5 plus MRES4c. In the proof any step that involves MRES4c can be replaced
by steps using only MRES1, MRES2, MRES4a, or MRES4b. Hence we can derive a
contradiction using only the resolution rules given in Section 5. ✷
8. Extension to the multi-modal case
Here we show how to extend the set of resolution rules given in Section 5.2 to
the multi-modal case. First we note that the translation to the normal form given in
Section 4 disallows clauses containing more than one different modal operator, i.e.,
true⇒ B1l ∨¬B2h would be rewritten as true⇒ B1l ∨ y and true⇒¬y ∨¬B2h where
y is a new proposition. This adopts our general strategy of keeping each modal component
separate. MRES1 has the additional restriction that both clauses must apply to the same
modal operator (i.e., they must be both i-belief clauses) or at least one of them must be a
literal clause and MRES2 is extended as follows.
[MRES1]
true ⇒ D ∨m
true ⇒ D′ ∨ ¬m
true ⇒ D ∨D′
[MRES2]
true ⇒ D ∨Bil
true ⇒ D′ ∨Bi¬l
true ⇒ D ∨D′
Similarly with MRES4a and MRES4b either both clauses must apply to the same modal
operator Bi or the second must be a literal clause.
[MRES4a]
true ⇒ D ∨¬Bil
true ⇒ D′ ∨ l
true ⇒ D ∨mod i (D′)
[MRES4b]
true ⇒ D ∨Bil
true ⇒ D′ ∨ ¬l
true ⇒ D ∨mod i (D′)
where mod i (D′) is defined as follows
mod i (F ∨G)=mod i (F )∨mod i (G) mod i (¬Bil)=¬Bil
mod i (Bi l)= Bil mod i (l)=¬Bi¬l.
We believe the proofs given in Section 7 can be extended to the multi-modal case.
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9. Related work
The work we have presented is a clausal resolution method for a branching-time
temporal logic of belief, i.e., the fusion of CTL and KD45.
Resolution methods have been described for a variety of modal logics in, for example,
[2,3,20,35,37–39]. These fall into two main groups, those that work in the modal logic
directly [2,35] or those that use a translation into first-order logic for example [37–39]. Our
system follows the former route and is based on that for propositional modal logic given
by Mints [35]. The use of new variables to represent subformulae whilst translating into
the normal form and then linking this new proposition with the subformula it represents
everywhere is essentially the renaming approach used in the transformation to the normal
form for temporal logics [40]. Proof methods for the branching-time temporal logic CTL
are described in, for example, [8,19]. Resolution based methods for propositional linear
time temporal logics are given in [1,10,25,45]. The temporal component of the resolution
mentioned here is based on that in [25].
However, few proof methods have been developed for the combination of temporal and
modal logics. A resolution based proof method for temporal logics of knowledge, i.e.,
the fusion of linear-time temporal logic with single and multi-modal S5 are given in [15,
17]. This uses a similar approach to the above, translation to a normal form to separate
modal and temporal components, a resolution method applied to the temporal part and
modal resolution rules applied to the modal part. Information is carried between the two
components using literal clauses. A resolution based approach to proof in the fusion of
linear time temporal logic with the fusion of any multi-modal logic that is an extension of
Km by the axioms 4, 5, B, D, T is given in [31]. In this paper, the authors translate to a
normal form which separates the modal and temporal components. The temporal resolution
method in [25] is adopted for the temporal part, whilst the proof method for the modal part
is based on the translation based approach [37], i.e., modal formulae are translated into
a fragment of first-order classical logic and then resolution inference rules for classical
logics applied.
Other proof methods for combined logics have been based on tableau methods. This
involves the construction of a stucture, for the negation of the formula to be shown valid,
from which a model can be extracted. The inability to construct such a stucture means that
the negated formula is unsatisfiable and the original, therefore, valid. A tableau based proof
method for the fusion of PTL plus either S5 or KD45 is given in [46] and a tableau based
method for a temporal belief logic is given in [47]. The work on proof methods for BDI-
logics given in [41,43] give a tableau based proof method for the fusion of either linear or
branching-time (CTL or CTL*) with the modal logics KD45 for belief, and KD for desire
and intention. Tableaux methods for description logics (essentially combinations of modal
logics) have been described and implemented in [30]. A tableau calculus is presented in
[34] for the basic description logicALC combined with propositional linear-time temporal
logic interpreted in models with constant domains.
Halpern, Vardi et al. consider the combination of propositional linear and branching
time temporal logics with multi-modal S5 allowing a variety of interactions in [27,29].
Rather than theorem proving this series of papers concentrates on the complexity of the
satisfiability problem and obtaining complete axiomatisations for various systems.
C. Dixon et al. / Artificial Intelligence 139 (2002) 47–89 87
Work has also been carried out into combining arbitrary logics, see for example the
work on fibring in [26], and issues relating to combining logics are considered in [4,5].
10. Concluding remarks
The logical representation of rational agents is currently a very active area of research.
However, few of the people involved in this research have considered proof methods for
these logics. The main reason for this is the complexity associated with combining multi-
modal and temporal logics. In our work with KARO, we have identified a simpler logic
which, while still comprising a combination of temporal and modal logics, is amenable to
mechanisation. Thus, in this paper we have presented a sound, complete and terminating
clausal resolution method for this particular logic.
Whilst this particular combination has been chosen due to our concentration on the
development of proof methods to be applied to KARO it is part of a wider work, i.e.,
the development of resolution based proof methods for a range of combined modal and
temporal logics. The method requires a translation into an SNF style normal form that
separates the different logical components, appropriate resolution methods to be applied
in each component with enough information being passed between components. Further,
we are developing methods to handle interaction between the components, for example in
logics that have axioms that involve both modal and temporal operators [14].
Whilst we have used the method to prove properties of small KARO specifications [32]
in the future we will apply this to larger logical specifications derived from the KARO
agent theory. In addition, we intend to investigate whether this simpler form of logic can
be used as the basis for other agent theories. Finally we would like to extend the amount
of KARO language we can cover by adding features such as interactions.
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